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The Necessary Interrelationship 
Between Land Use and Preservation 
of Groundwater Resources 
by Linda A. Malonefl. 
Depletion and contamination of groundwater resources is one of 
the most pressing environmental issues in the United States. In re-
sponse to growing public concern, Congress has recently amended 
existing legislation, ostensibly to provide increased protection for 
groundwater resources. State and local governments have also re-
sponded with legislative efforts to address the depletion and con-
tamination of groundwater. Unfortunately, the latest federal 
amendments provide little hope for protecting our valuable ground-
water resources. This article explains why the federal response is 
still insufficient, and considers the need for a comprehensive federal 
statute regulating groundwater. State and local regulation has been 
more promising, but ultimately, meaningful protection for ground-
water will require making difficult land use decisions that depart 
from traditional notions of private property. This article concludes 
that a sliding scale approach to reform of groundwater regulation 
will be the most responsive in resolving the competing values of 
private property rights and preservation of a fragile environmental 
resource. 
I. 
GROUNDWATER USE 
Groundwater is subsurface water beneath the water table in satu-
rated soils and geologic formations known as aquifers. 1 In the 
United States, groundwater provides drinking water for more than 
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1. T. HENDERSON, J. TRAUBERMAN & T. GALLAGHER, GROUNDWATER STRATE-
GIES FOR STATE AcriON 2 (1984) [hereinafter HENDERSON). A water table is the 
depth at which an aquifer, a confined or unconfined body of water, is found closest to 
the surface. /d. Water under pressure in confined aquifers is known as artesian water. 
A. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES,§ 4.02[1) (1988). 
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one half the population, and accounts for a fourth of all fresh water 
used. Worldwide, groundwater comprises ninety-five percent of all 
fresh water, excluding glaciers.2 Approximately seventy-five per-
cent of the municipal drinking water supply relies on groundwater 
to some extent, while most of the population in rural areas relies 
solely on wells. 3 Seventy-five percent of groundwater use is for irri-
gation alone,4 and five hundred thousand new wells are created 
every year.5 Groundwater and surface water are hydrologically in-
terrelated. Groundwater produces thirty percent of all surface 
stream flow, 6 and streams, lakes, wetlands, and oceans in turn 
recharge groundwater.7 From 1950 to 1980, total groundwater 
withdrawals nearly tripled to eighty-nine billion gallons per day.8 
Groundwater pollution originates from many different sources, 
some of which have only recently been discovered. The sources of 
groundwater pollution include waste disposal, underground storage 
tanks, oil leaks and spills, drilling and operation of oil, gas, and 
water wells, agricultural practices, and, to a lesser extent, road salt-
ing, surface water pollution, and air pollution.9 Many common 
2. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at xix, 1, 4. It also accounts for 22% of the nation's 
fresh water supply. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, at§ 4.02(2]. 
3. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 7. 
4. HENDERSON, supra note 1. Much of the use of groundwater is in the arid West, 
with California and Texas alone accounting for one-third of all groundwater with· 
drawn. Id. at 9. 
5. HENDERSON, supra note 1. 
6. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 4. 
7. HENDERSON, supra note 1. 
8. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 1. 
9. Ponds for wastewater and waste disposal leak over 100 billion gallons of waste per 
year into groundwater. MILLER, W ASrE DISPOSAL EFFECTS ON GROUND WATER 508 
(1980). Landfills leak over 90 billion gallons of contaminated leachate into ground-
water. Id. A study in 1983 determined that poorly designed septic systems were the 
largest source of contamination of groundwater by volume of groundwater affected. 
PYE, PATRICK, & QUARLES, GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 19-20 (1983). Municipal wastewater systems introduce nitrates, phosphates, 
heavy metals, pathogens, and hydrocarbons, among other pollutants, into groundwater. 
MILLER, supra, at 206. Spreading of industrial and municipal sludge may contaminate 
groundwater with nitrates, heavy metals, and salt. EPA, Report to Congress: Waste 
Disposal Practices and their Effects on Groundwater (1977). Mining activities create 
acids, dissolved solids, radioactive materials, and metals. MILLER, supra, at 322. Oil 
and gas contaminate groundwater with hydrocarbons; leaking underground gas tanks 
are a major source of contamination, regulated only recently. See generally J. WILSON, 
GROUND WATER: A NON-TECHNICAL GUIDE (1982). Saline intrusion into fresh 
water is frequently attributed to improper installation, use, and abandonment of wells. 
See generally FUHRIMAN & BARTON, GROUND WATER POLLUTION IN ARIZONA, 
CALIFORNIA, NEVADA, AND UTAH (1971). Irrigation, use of chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides, animal feedlot wastes, and aspects of dry-land farming are some agricultural 
activities that result in groundwater contamination. Contamination from pesticides and 
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groundwater pollutants are carcinogenic. 10 The varying pace and 
movement of underground water flow makes it extremely difficult 
to predict the path and extent of groundwater contamination. 11 
Nevertheless, a 1988 study indicated that 100 to 200 trillion gallons 
of groundwater are polluted. 12 In 1981, EPA regional studies found 
serious groundwater contamination by toxic pollutants in thirty-
four states. 13 
At present, the two most common technologies for groundwater 
cleanup are containment and treatment. 14 Both techniques are ex-
tremely difficult and expensive, and are effective only for areas of a 
few acres. 15 Additionally, containment only limits the damage al-
ready done. 
The National Water Commission concluded in 1973 that the 
three main problems of groundwater law were (1) a lack of inte-
grated management of surface water and groundwater, (2) depletion 
of groundwater at a rate exceeding recharge, and (3) impairment of 
groundwater quality. 16 As early as 1984, EPA groundwater protec-
tion strategy called for a partnership of federal, state, and local gov-
ernments in the "enormous effort" of protecting groundwater and 
preserving both the public health and the environment.~' To date, 
however, the partnership has been somewhat one-sided, and has 
fertilizers is perhaps the most widespread type of groundwater pollution. See id. at 16. 
In addition, polluted surface waters, dissolving road salt. toxic air pollutants such as 
lead, cadmium, and mercury, and acid rain all contribute to groundwater pollution. /d. 
at 16-17. 
Which of these pollutants is the cause of contamination depends upon the prevalent 
land uses in a given area. In industrial areas, groundwater is frequently contaminated 
with chemicals from industrial discharges and waste disposal. Coastal areas and arid 
areas have problems with groundwater pollution from saline contamination through 
excessive well pumping. Agricultural areas suffer from pesticide and fertilizer contami-
nation, while groundwater underlying cities is polluted by urban runoff and gasoline 
leakage. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 18. 
10. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 18. 
11. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 4. 
12. PYE, PATRICK & QUARLES, supra note 9, at 81-82. 
13. Council on Environmental Quality, Contamination of Groundwater by Toxic 
Organic Chemicals 1, 3 (1981). 
14. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 19. In conjunction with groundwater cleaning, 
there is frequently excavation and removal of contaminated soil. /d. at 21. 
15. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 21. 
16. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.03. 
17. EPA, A Draft Ground-Water Protection Strategy for the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency 3 (1984). EPA's groundwater strategy allows for the classification of aqui-
fers into three categories with the primary responsibility on the states to protect 
groundwater quality with federal funding. The three classifications are "special" 
groundwater that is an "irreplaceable" source of drinking water, groundwater that is a 
current or potential source of drinking water but not irreplaceable, and groundwater 
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contributed little to solving the pressing problems of groundwater 
law. 
No federal statute deals comprehensively with groundwater allo-
cation or protection. Federal regulation has addressed the acute 
problems of impure drinking water, waste disposal, and toxic con-
tamination in a piecemeal fashion after they have occurred rather 
than attempting to protect and preserve the resources threatened by 
these problems. Traditionally, allocation of water resources has 
been left to state law, which only recently has begun to regulate 
groundwater as a limited resource. State environmental law usually 
provides private remedies for groundwater contamination instead of 
the remedies a comprehensive federal environmental statute could 
offer. As a result, laws regulating use of groundwater are at best 
scattered and disjointed, and at worst confused and ineffective. 
II. 
ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS IN GROUNDWATER 
A. In General 
To a large degree, states regulate groundwater through allocation 
of water rights and state common law. Groundwater allocation 
rules govern the withdrawal and consumption of groundwater for 
beneficial purposes such as drinking water, irrigation, and manufac-
turing. When an inadequate supply of groundwater exists to satisfy 
competing users, allocation rules determine the priority and extent 
of use for each claimant. 
Although groundwater and surface water are hydrologically in-
terrelated, state law has traditionally distinguished between the two 
and applied different legal systems to each. 18 Moreover, allocation 
rules for groundwater can vary depending on whether the ground-
water source is classified as artesian waters, percolating waters, or 
an underground water course. 19 Other aspects of groundwater by-
that is not a potential source of drinking water. See Getches, Controlling Groundwater 
Use and Quality: A Fragmented System, 11 NAT. RESOURCES J. 623 (1985). 
18. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.03. 
19. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.03. Underground streams have been tradition· 
ally subject, however, to surface water rules. See, e.g., Maricopa County Mun. Water 
Conservation Dist. v. Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65,4 P.2d 369 (1931) (superseded 
by statute as explained in Chino Valley v. Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 638 P.2d 1324 (1981)); 
Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910); Hale v. McLea, 53 Cal. 
578 (1879); Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 345 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1961); and Metropolitan 
Util. Dist. v. Merrit Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966). California has 
the most comprehensive regulation of interrelated surface rights and subsurface flows. 
See, e.g., United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Uti!. Irrigation Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. 
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drology further complicate effective state management. For exam-
ple, it is difficult and expensive to identify the user responsible for 
groundwater depletion in any system of groundwater allocation be-
cause of the number of users drawing from any common source. 
Efficient allocation also requires foresight in anticipating future uses 
and needs for groundwater. Finally, controlled management of 
groundwater depends upon the rate of recharge of an aquifer. Some 
aquifers can be managed as renewable resources by setting a safe 
annual yield or sustained yield over a period of years. Pumping that 
exceeds this safe or sustained yield is called groundwater mining. 20 
The four different systems of groundwater allocation in the 
United States are the "English" rule of absolute ownership, the 
"American" rule of reasonable use, the correlative rights rule, and 
the prior appropriation rule.2t 
Under the "English" rule, every landowner who owns property 
over groundwater has an absolute right to withdraw any and all of 
that groundwater. 22 The English case of Acton v. Blundell, 23 af-
firming the traditional right of a landowner to own the airspace 
above and the soil beneath property forms the basis of this doctrine. 
American courts adopted this rule based partly on the assumption 
that it is unfair to compel the offending landowner to redress a 
wrong which the person could not notice. 24 The doctrine is still 
accepted primarily in some New England states which face no 
groundwater shortages.25 This rule fails to recognize the exhaus-
Cal. 1958); City ofLodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 316,60 P.2d 439 (1936); 
City of San Bernadino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198 P. 784 (1921); Hudson v. 
Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 105 P. 748 (1909); City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 
57 P. 585 (1899), error dismissed, Hooker v. City of Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314 (1903); 
see also Grant, The Complexities of Managing Hydrologically Connected Surface Water 
and Groundwater Under the Appropriation Doctrine, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 63 
(1987). 
20. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.03. 
21. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 30. 
22. R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS§ 17.1 (1967). 
23. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. ch. 1843). Although the defendant Blundell had left his 
neighbor's well dry, the court upheld his right to do so because a landowner owns every-
thing from the center of the earth to the heavens and because courts should not try to 
apportion a "moveable, wandering thing." /d. at 1233-35; see also Rossmann & Steel, 
Forging the New Water Law: Public Regulation of"Proprietary" Groundwater Rights, 33 
HAsTINGs L.J. 903, 906 (1982). The case has been criticized for its lack of considera-
tion of the finite nature of groundwater attributable to a lack of scientific knowledge. 
See Rossmann & Steel, supra, at 907; R. CLARK, supra note 22, § 17.1. 
24. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.04 (citing Wheatly v. Baugh, 25 Pn. 528, 534 
(1855)). 
25. The absolute ownership doctrine is still utilized in Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
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tible nature of groundwater and the problem of its potential 
depletion. 26 
In response to the rule of absolute ownership, many state courts 
began qualifying the rule through reasonable limitations on the 
right of any one landowner to deplete groundwater. Under the 
"reasonable use" rule, no owner of overlying land can withdraw 
more than a reasonable amount of groundwater,27 and the water 
withrawn must be for a beneficial purpose on the overlying land.28 
Reasonableness is based on such factors as well location, amount of 
water, and the proposed use and placement of the water.29 Use on 
non-overlying land is per se unreasonable. 30 If the requirements of 
and Texas. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.04; see generally Hartford Rayon Corp. v. 
Cromwell Water Co., 126 Conn. 194, 10 A.2d 587 (1940); Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 
533 (1850); Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 244 La. 
662, 153 So. 2d 880 (1963); Chase v. Silverstone, 62 Me. 175 (1873); Buffum v. Harris, 5 
R.I. 243 (1858); City of Sherman v. Public Util. Comm'n of Texas, 643 S.W.2d 681 
(fex. 1983); and City of Corpus Christi, v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 
S.W.2d 798 (1955). One commentator has suggested that it is "doubtful" that Rhode 
Island will continue to allow absolute ownership and noted that the Vermont legislature 
in 1985 adopted the correlative rights rule in place of absolute ownership. A. 
TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.04. There is also some confusion as to whether absolute 
ownership is the prevailing doctrine in Indiana. Id. (citing Wiggins v. Brazil Coal & 
Clay Co., 440 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)}, vacated, 452 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1983); 
Prohosky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 584 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1984}, reversed in part, 
767 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1985). 
Under the strictest application of absolute ownership, it did not even matter if the 
withdrawal was maliciously done to deprive a neighbor of water. See, e.g., Huber v. 
Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903), overruled, State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., 
Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974); contra, Gagnon v. French Sick Springs 
Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687, 72 N.E. 849 (1904). Texas does impose limited liability for 
subsidence caused by negligent pumping. Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith· 
Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21 (fex. 1978); see also Johnson, Texas Groundwater 
Law: A Survey and Some Proposals, 22 Nat. Resources J. 1017 (1982). 
26. R. CLARK, supra note 22, § 17.1. 
27. See, e.g., Jarvis v. State Land Dep't, 106 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970); 
Rothrauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940). The landmark 
case rejecting the absolute ownership doctrine and establishing reasonable use limita· 
tions is Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179 (1862). 
28. For a case involving interpretation of the concept of "overlying land" which was 
legislatively overruled, see Farmers Inv. Co. v. Bettwy, 113 Ariz. 520, 558 P.2d 14 
(1976). See generally Looney, Modification of Arkansas Water Law: Issues Alternatives, 
38 ARK L. REv. 221, 245 (1984). 
29. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 31. 
30. States that have adopted the reasonable use rule include Alabama, Florida, llli· 
nois, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, North Carolina and Tennessee. Sloss-Sheffield 
Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 (1936), overruled, Henderson v. 
Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1980); Koch v. Wick, 87 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 
1956) and Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 373.ot3 (1988 & Supp. 1989); Bridgman v. Sanitary Dist. 
of Decatur, 164 Ill. App. 3d 287, 517 N.E.2d 309 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1987); United Fuel 
Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953), Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley, 292 Ky. 
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the rule are met, a landowner may withdraw groundwater even if 
doing so deprives another landowner of the reasonable use of the 
groundwater.31 The rule may prohibit waste to the extent that it 
deters unreasonable use, 32 but this restriction may do nothing more 
than prohibit malicious pumping. 33 
Furthermore, the reasonable use rule does not appear to create a 
right in a senior pumper to maintain the pressure of groundwater 
necessary to support the least expensive means of withdrawal. 
Western states and a few common law states have generally held 
that a "right to lift" groundwater at a fixed pressure level is not part 
of a prior appropriator's rights. 34 This modification allows junior 
pumpers to decrease the pressure level previously enjoyed by senior 
pumpers by a reasonable amount. 
The "correlative rights" doctrine gives equal rights to overlying 
land owners. In periods of insufficient groundwater, the available 
water is apportioned among the landowners in relation to the 
168, 166 S.W.2d 293 (1942); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 
(1968); Forbell v. City of New York, 47 App. Div. 371, 61 N.Y.S. 1005 (1900), aff'd, 
164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Rouse v. City of Kingston, 188 N.C. I, 123 S.E. 482 
(1924); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 89 S.W.2d 889 (1935). 
31. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.05[1], (citing United Fuels Gas Co. v. Sawyer, 
259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953)); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 
(1968); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1971); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer. 
Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962); Rouse v. City of Kingston, 188 N.C. 1, 123 
S.E. 482 (1924); Rothrauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940); 
Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 89 S.W.2d 889 (1935); Clinch-
field Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927) (dictum); Pence v. Car-
ney, 58 W.Va. 296, 52 S.E. 702 (1905). 
32. See generally Moses, Basic Groundwater Problems, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. 
INST. 501, 509 (1969). 
33. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.05[1]. 
34. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 6.04[3]. See, e.g., City of Colorado Springs v. 
Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); Erickson v. Crookston Water Works, 
Power & Light Co., 105 Minn. 182, 117 N.W. 435 (1908); Woodsum v. Township of 
Pemberton, 172 N.J. Super. 489,412 A.2d 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), aff'd 
on other grounds, 427 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Mathers v. Texaco, 
Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966); Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah 2d 97, 
458 P.2d 861 (1969); see also Comment, Protection of the Means of Groundwater Dil·er-
son, 20 NAT. REsoURCES J. 626 (1980); Grant, Reasonable Groundwater Pumping 
Levels Under the Appropriation Doctrine.· The Law and Underlying Economic Goofs, 21 
NAT. REsOURCES J. 1 (1981); Lingo v. City of Jacksonville, 258 Ark. 63, 522 S.W.2d 
403 (1975) (acknowledging a limited right to static pressure in senior pumpers). 
It is well established that cities must compensate other pumpers injured by export of 
water. See A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.05[3] (citing Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 
Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936)); Meeker v. City of E. Orange, 77 NJ. Law 623,74 A. 379 
(1909). In most cases, however, pumpers injured by municipal pumpers will be denied 
injunctive relief when the equities are balanced. See, e.g., Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1971). 
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amount of land owned over the groundwater source.35 In Califor-
nia, where the doctrine was first developed,36 overlying landowners 
are entitled to a "fair and just portion" of the common ground-
water, 37 but have no right to the maintenance of the natural water 
table.38 Non-overlying landowners may obtain appropriation rights 
if there is surplus water over a predetermined safe annual yield and 
no overlying landowners need the surplus.39 If the basis is over-
drawn, use is restricted to overlying landowners.40 
In contrast to the correlative rights doctrine, the doctrine of prior 
appropriation gives priority to groundwater uses that are first in 
time.41 The doctrine, which in some states is part of state common 
law and in others is created by statute, 42 gives states more authority 
to allocate groundwater. Generally, groundwater must be used ben-
eficially. In times of scarcity, "senior" appropriators who put 
groundwater to beneficial use receive priority over "junior" appro-
priators.43 The doctrine is prevalent in the western United States 
35. See, e.g., Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). 
36. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). 
37. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.06[1]. 
38. Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677,76 P.2d 681 (1938). 
39. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1985). 
40. Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 
122 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1975). Overdraft in California is determined by reference to a safe 
yield for the basin evaluated over a twenty-nine year period. City of Los Angeles v. City 
of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). For a discussion of how the 
California Supreme Court has modified the correlative rights doctrine in California, see 
A. T ARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.06[3], [4]. 
41. See, e.g., City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 
(1948), cert. denied sub nom California-Michigan Land and Water Co. v. City of 
Pasadena, 339 U.S. 937 (1950); Alpaugh Irrigation Dist. v. Kern County, 113 Cal. App. 
2d 286, 248 P.2d 117 (1952); Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 8 Cal. 2d 522, 
66 P.2d 443 (1937). 
42. The doctrine has been adopted in Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, and New Jersey. Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 
111 (1957); MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d 
417 (1963); Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 105 Minn. 182, 
117 N.W. 435 (1908); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1971); Prather 
v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978); Woodsum v. Township of 
Pemberton, 172 N.J. Super. 489, 412 A.2d 1064 (1980), aff'd, 177 N.J. Super. 639, 427 
A.2d 615 (1981). 
43. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 31. When the amount of water needed exceeds the 
recharge rate of the aquifer, many states impose acceptable pumping levels for the state 
or for regions within the state. In general, to establish a water right under the prior 
appropriation system, the claimant must: intend to appropriate the water; divert it from 
its channel; and apply it to a beneficial use. 0. MATIHEWS, WATER RESOURCES, GE-
OGRAPHY, AND LAW 42 (1984). Under permit systems, the permit application is suffi-
cient evidence of the intention to appropriate water. I d. Problems frequently arise in 
satisfying the diversion requirement. As to the beneficial use requirement, mining, man· 
ufacturing, irrigation, stock watering, and domestic uses have traditionally been deemed 
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where many states have codified it. These states also require per-
mits to establish priority applications for groundwater use.44 The 
appropriation doctrine is the only doctrine of the four that does not 
necessarily relate water rights to ownership of the land overlying 
the groundwater.45 
Currently, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wy-
oming have adopted the prior appropriation doctrine.46 Occasion-
ally, states have exempted from the doctrine's reach groundwater 
that is a by-product of secondary oil and gas recovery, geothermal 
resources, or water from mine dewatering.47 Colorado, Kansas, 
beneficial uses, with the more recent and still unsettled addition of recreation, aesthet-
ics, and preservation of environmental values being considered beneficial uses. /d. at 43. 
44. R. CLARK, supra note 22, § 441. 
45. 0. MATIHEWS, supra note 43, at 6. 
46. IDAHO CoDE§ 42-226 (1977 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1020. 
1035 (1985); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 85-2-501-520 {1987); NEV. REv. STAT. § 534.020 
(1986 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 72-12-1-28 (1987); N.D. CENT. CoDE§§ 61-
01-01 and 61-04-02 (1985 & Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT.§ 537.505 (1988); S.D. CoDI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-3 (1983 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 73-1-1 (1980 & 
Supp. 1988); WASH. REv. CoDE§ 90.44.020 (1962 & Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT.§ 41-3-
903 (1985 & Supp. 1988). Western groundwater-reliant states conspicuously absent 
from this list include Arizona, California, Colorado, Nebraska, and Texas. Arizona 
regulates groundwater under a statutory conservation system that creates property 
rights in prior users. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 45-411-417 (1980 & Supp. 1988). Col-
orado does apply the prior appropriation doctrine to designated groundwater basins and 
tributary groundwater. CoLO. REv. STATE.§ 37-92-103 (1982 & Supp. 1988). Califor-
nia applies the correlative rights doctrine to most groundwater. See supra notes 36-40 
and accompanying text; see also Trager, Emerging Forums for Groundwater Dispute 
Resolution in California: A Glimpse at the Second Generation of Groundwater Issues and 
How Agencies Work Towards Problem Resolution, 20 PAC. LJ. 31 (1988); Rossman & 
Steel, supra note 23. Nebraska's system is a combination of reasonable use, correlative 
rights, and special district regulation, Metropolitan Util. Dist of Omaha v. Merritt 
Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966). While Texas continues to utilize the 
absolute ownership rule, see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text The change 
from common law systems to prior appropriation has been challenged as unconstitu-
tional in western states, but without success. Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 
131 Ariz. 78, 638 P.2d 1324. appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982), reh'g denied, 459 
U.S. 899 (1982); Aikins v. Arizona Dept of Water Resources, 154 Ariz. 437, 743 P.2d 
946 (Ariz. App. 1987); Larrick v. North Kiowa Bijou Management Dist., 181 Colo. 
395, 510 P.2d 323 (1973); Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578, 
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963), reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963); Baeth v. Hois-
veen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968); Knight v. Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 
(1964); Petersen v. Department of Ecology, 92 Wash. 2d 306, 596 P.2d 285 (1979). To 
deal with deficiencies in water allocation in western states, one proposal has been in-
creased use of water marketing of instream flows and groundwater. Anderson & Leal, 
Going with the Flow: Marketing /nstream Flows and Groundwater, 13 COLUMB. J. 
ENVT. L. 317 (1988); see also Balleau, Water Appropriation and Transfer in a General 
Hydrogeologic System, 28 Nat. Resources J. 269 (1988). 
47. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 6.03(3]. Withdrawals of groundwater as a source 
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Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and Oregon have com-
bined prior appropriation with critical area legislation to designate 
areas where new pumping may be prohibited and existing pumping 
may be restricted to preserve an acceptable amount of ground-
water.48 Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico further limit ground-
water mining and extraction to a rate that will restore the aquifer to 
the level necessary for economically feasible extraction. 49 
Liability for excessive or improper groundwater use varies de-
pending upon which of the four rules of allocation is applied. In an 
absolute ownership jurisdiction, overlying landowners have an in-
definite right of usage. The landowner may use whatever ground-
water can be pumped without liability for the harm or expenses 
incurred by others. 50 Under the reasonable use doctrine, a land-
owner is liable for any harm caused by unreasonable use of underly-
ing groundwater. Using water off the overlying land is 
unreasonable per se and can be remedied by an injunction or dam-
ages. 51 In some jurisdictions, the overlying landowner may with-
draw water for a reasonable use on the overlying land without 
incurring liability, even if the withdrawal causes subsidence of sur-
rounding land. 52 There is little or no restriction on the amount of 
from appropriation and exportation is, however, constitutionally suspect since the 
Supreme Court decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rei. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), 
that groundwater is an article ofinterstate commerce. See, e.g., City ofEI Paso through 
its Pub. Serv. Bd. v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983). But see Trelease, State 
Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U. COLO. L. RBv. 347 
(1985); Trelease, Interstate Use of Water: Sporhase v. El Paso, Pike & Vermejo, 22 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 315 (1987). 
48. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1020-1035 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-506 
(1987); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 534.010-187 (1986 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. § 72·12-20 
(1987); ORE. REv. STAT.§ 537.730 (1988). The Idaho courts have also upheld limiting 
available water to the annual recharge rate and injunctions against junior wells that 
exceed the reasonably anticipated future rate of recharge. Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 
95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973); State ex rei. Tappan v. Smith, 92 Idaho 451, 444 
P.2d 412 (1968); Briggs v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 546 P.2d 
382 (1976). 
49. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 6.05[2]. 
50. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 6.05[2]. This is still the rule in Texas and Louisi-
ana. ld. 
51. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
52. See, e.g., Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 (1968); Bayer 
v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962); New York Continental 
Jewell Filtration Co. v. Jones, 37 App. D.C. 511 (D.C. Cir. 1911). This immunity from 
liability is, however, "arguably inconsistent with a landowner's duty to maintain the 
lateral and subjacent support of neighboring lands in their natural condition." A. 
TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.07, (citing Prete v. Cray, 49 R.I. 209, 141 A. 609 (1928)); 
see also Note, The Right to Subjacent Support of Oil and Gas, 49 CAL. L. RBV. 353 
(1961); Garland, Subsidence Resulting/rom the Removal of Groundwater, 12 S. Tax. L. 
REv. 201 (1970). Massachusetts among other jurisdictions does impose liability for 
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use under either rule, nor is there any balancing of the desirability 
of competing uses. 
By contrast, the correlative rights rule limits each landowner to a 
reasonable share of groundwater. This share is usually based on 
acreage which may be significantly less than the amount of ground-
water that could be withdrawn under the reasonable use rule. sJ 
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, junior users are liable to 
senior users for harm caused to any vested senior rights.S4 Under 
statutory systems for prior appropriation of groundwater, liability 
depends on the extent of the violation to statutory rights; only un-
reasonable harm is actionable. ss 
Section 858 of the second Restatement ofTorts explicitly protects 
overlying landowners from liability for withdrawal unless: (1) the 
withdrawal unreasonably causes harm to a neighboring landowner 
by lowering the water table or reducing artesian pressure; (2) the 
withdrawal exceeds a reasonable share of the annual supply or total 
store of groundwater; or (3) the withdrawal has a direct and sub-
stantial effect upon a watercourse or lake and unreasonably causes 
harm to a person entitled to the use of such water. s6 Although the 
Restatement most closely resembles the reasonable use and correla-
tive rights rules, it significantly differs from both. Unlike the rea-
sonable use rule, the Restatement balances the equities and 
hardships between competing users. And, unlike the correlative 
subsidence, at least when done negligently. Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 
195 N.E.2d 65 (1964); see also Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900 
(Ala. 1980); Labruzzo v. Atlantic Dredging & Constr. Co., 54 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1951); 
but see Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 (1936). 
53. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
54. 0. MATTHEWS, supra note 43, at 43. The senior user also has an obligation to 
the junior user to maintain the conditions of use that existed at the time of the junior 
appropriation. /d. at 44. 
Appropriators must also be careful to avoid abandonment or forfeiture of their water 
rights. Abandonment occurs when there is a cessation of use along with "manifestation 
of intent" to abandon the right. /d. Because of the difficulty in proof of abandonment, 
many states now have forfeiture statutes that extinguish water rights after a statutorily 
set period of non-use. Id. 
55. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
56. A. TARLOCK, supra note I,§ 4.06[5]. The Restatement rule has been adopted in 
Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin. Maerz v. United States Steel Corp., 323 N.W.2d 524 
(Mich. App. 1982); Cline v. American Aggregates Corp., 15 Ohio St. 3d 384, 474 
N.E.2d 324 (1984); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 
339 (1974). Nebraska as a matter of its own state law has adopted the Restatement 
approach. Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. I, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978). Indiana has 
rejected the rule in section 858. Wiggins v. Brazil Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958 
(Ind. App. 1983). 
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rights rule, the Restatement does not tie allocation of water rights 
to ownership of overlying acreage. 
B. Permit Systems 
The "steady trend" in groundwater regulation has been to estab-
lish state permit systems for groundwater withdrawal.57 Every 
western state except Texas requires some kind of permit for ground-
water withdrawals. 58 States 59 generally utilize either of two types of 
permit systems. Most western states require a permit for all 
groundwater withdrawals, with common exceptions for domestic 
use, watering of stock, and watering of gardens or lawns. 60 The 
second system only requires permits for particular sources of 
groundwater or for groundwater in designated areas where there is 
excessive groundwater withdrawal. 61 Both types of permit systems 
provide an administrative method of protecting water rights instead 
of relying on piecemeal litigation between competing water users. 
Permit requirements vary from state to state and incorporate 
whatever priority for groundwater the state employs-correlative 
rights, reasonable use, absolute ownership, or prior appropriation. 62 
In the western states, permit systems predominantly incorporate the 
doctrine of prior appropriation. 63 In the eastern, more humid 
states, permit systems follow four different approaches: (1) a com-
mon permit system for ground and surface water; (2) a separate 
permit system for groundwater; (3) a common law approach that 
yields in emergencies when high capacity pumpers can be ordered 
to reduce pumping; and (4) a permit system that only applies in 
critical areas.64 Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Wisconsin use an integrated system which co-
ordinates groundwater withdrawal with surface water needs. 65 
57. R. CLARK, supra note 22, § 441. 
58. R. CLARK, supra note 22, § 441. Texas does provide for voluntary creation of 
local management districts. Id. 
59. This generalization excludes Texas, Nebraska, and Hawaii. 
60. R. CLARK, supra note 22, § 442.1. 
61. R. CLARK, supra note 22, § 442.1. 
62. See A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.09[1)-[4]. 
63. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.09[1)-(4). 
64. A. T ARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.09[1]. Generally constitutional challenges to 
substitution of permit systems for common law rights have been unsuccessful. Id. 
§ 3.20[3); see, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Ohio Oil 
Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 
2d 663 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979); Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minnesota 
Dept. of Natural Resources, 300 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1980). 
65. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-367-368 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 373.013-.197 (West 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.269-273 (1990); 
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States with separate permit systems for groundwater include Flor-
ida, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. 66 
Surface water can replenish groundwater, but this "recharge" 
rate may be slower than the rate of withdrawal, 67 in which case, the 
groundwater will eventually become exhausted. 68 Because none of 
the groundwater allocation rules has as its primary purpose the 
preservation of the water source, many states have imposed statu-
tory limits on withdrawal. One such method is legislation which 
restricts or prohibits withdrawal of groundwater in critical areas. 69 
STAT. §§ 151.120, .170 (1982 & Supp. 1988); Mo. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 8-802 
(1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. N.C. 143.214.15 (1988); and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.026 
(West 1974 & Supp. 1988). The most elaborate of these systems is the Florida Water 
Resources Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.013-.197 (West 1988). The act creates dis-
tricts which set minimum groundwater maintenance levels and issue twenty-year renew-
able permits for withdrawal. To obtain a permit an applicant must demonstrate that 
there will be no interference with existing uses, that there will be a reasonable-beneficial 
use, and that the proposed use is consistent with the public interest. !d. § 373.223; see 
also FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN., r. 17-40 (listing relevant factors to a reasonable-benefi-
cial use). Competing applications are assessed by which best serves the public interest. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.233 (West 1988). Groundwater may also be transported 
outside the basin or used on nonoverlying land if justified by the public interesL ld. 
§ 373.233. 
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.013-.197 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41 
(West 1987 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. ENVTL CoNSERV. L. § 15-1527 (Consol. 1982 & 
Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (1970 & Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144.025(e) (West 1974 & Supp. 1988). Wisconsin requires permits for withdrawals in 
excess of 100,000 gallons a day. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.025(e). Oklahoma is unique in 
that it allocates groundwater based on a ..... percentage of the total annual yield of the 
basin ... which is equal to the percentage of land overlying the fresh groundwater basin 
which he owns or leases." OKLA. STAT. tiL 82, § 1020.9 (1970 & Supp. 1989). Minne-
sota's comprehensive statute contains five preferences for groundwater withdrawals. 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 105.41 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). Class A permits are required 
for withdrawals in areas in which adequate groundwater exists; a class B permit with its 
more stringent submission requirements is necessary in all other areas. MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 105.416. All wells must be constructed in accordance with a state code to be 
protected from interference by subsequent pumpers. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 105.416{3). 
Thus, the state decides how many wells may draw on a basin but does not allocate water 
in times of shortage among pumpers. A. TARLOCK, supra note I, § 4.09(3]. New York 
only requires a permit to drill on Long Island for an installed pumping capacity of 
forty-five gallons a minute, with an exemption for fire-fighting and agriculture. N.Y. 
ENVTL. CoNSER. LAW§ 15-1527 (1984 & Supp. 1989). In granting permits, the New 
York Department of Environmental Conservation must consider: "'(!) [the] specific 
yield of the aquifer, (2) the anticipated amount of the withdrawal, (3) whether the aqui-
fer is over or understressed, (4) the proposed use of the water and whether the water 
will return to the aquifer as fresh recharge or as waste, (5) the relationship between the 
amount of the requested withdrawal and the level of existing local and regional with-
drawals, and (6) the degree of consistency between the requested rate of withdrawal and 
any regional water management plans." N.Y. ENVTL. CoNSER. LAw§ 15-1527(3). 
67. 0. MATTHEWS, supra note 43, at 10. 
68. ld. 
69. !d. 
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In Georgia, Indiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Virginia the state designates restricted areas in 
which large capacity pumpers must obtain a permit and reduce con-
sumption during emergency shortages.70 Increasingly, states are 
also beginning to protect critical recharge areas through land use 
restrictions. For example, New York has designated Long Island 
and Schenectady as "primary water supply aquifer areas" in which 
incompatible uses, such as landfills, are prohibited or restricted. 71 
Other states set schedules, limited by the legislature, that provide 
for controlled depletion over a period of years. In some jurisdic-
tions, withdrawals may not exceed the natural recharge rate, 72 
while in others, the rate of depletion may exceed the recharge rate 
but is limited to an acceptable rate. 73 Most permit systems require 
both a well permit authorizing the the drilling for water and a water 
right permit authorizing the use of the water. 74 
C. Conjunctive Use 
"Conjunctive use" refers to the coordinated appropriation of 
ground and surface waters which are hydrologically connected. 7' 
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-90-105 (1985 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE§ 13-2-2-1-13 
(1987); Miss. CODE ANN.§§ 51-4-1-19 (1981 & Supp. 1988); N.J. REV. STAT.§ 58:1A-
15 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 143-215.15 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 49-5-1-120 (Law Co-op. 1987); VA. CODE ANN.§ 62.1-44.36-44 (1987). 
71. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW§ 15-0514 (1984 & Supp. 1989), discussed in A. 
TARLOCK,supra note 1, § 4.10. See also FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 373.0395 (West 1988). For 
a discussion of similar, local controls, see M. JAFFE & F. DINovo, Local Groundwater 
Protection 148-152 (1987). Protection of critical recharge areas under lhe zoning power 
has been upheld. Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Boaril of Comm'rs of Metro. Dade 
County, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
72. M. JAFFE & F. DINovo, supra note 71, at 148-152. 
73. Id. 
74. See A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.09[3). 
75. Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water, 273 RocKY MTN. 
MIN. L. lNST. 1853, 1854 (1982). The focus of this section is on water rights and their 
effects on land use rather than on groundwater management policies and strategies. 
When used in the chapter, therefore, "conjunctive use" refers to the different systems 
for coordination of water rights between surface waters and hydrologically connected 
groundwater. 
An entirely different concept of "conjunctive use" beyond the scope of this discussion 
is conjunctive use management which attempts to satisfy water needs through flexible 
utilization of surface water and groundwater. See Trelease, supra at 1854. For exam· 
pie, conjunctive use management may allow rights to water in both the interconnected 
sources supplies by delivering water to the senior appropriator from a new source at the 
junior user's expense to permit the junior user to assume the senior user's prior right, 
and may even allow importation of surface water to replenish unconnected ground· 
water. Id. at 1860-80. For a discussion of the relatively undeveloped law of liability for 
unintended consequences of this type of conjunctive management, see A. T ARLOCK, 
supra note 1, § 4.05[4]. 
1990] GROUNDWATER AND LAND USE 15 
Historically courts focused on a defendant user's water rights at the 
point of diversion, but it made little sense to apply different rules for 
surface water diversion and groundwater diversion when the water 
affected was from the same hydrological source.76 Today, the basic 
principle of conjunctive use holds that the same law should apply to 
both sources if the surface water and groundwater are so closely 
connected that the diversion of one affects the other. 77 
There are three basic approaches to regulating interconnected 
groundwater and surface water. Many states fail to recognize con-
junctive use and treat the two water sources as distinct, subjecting 
each to different rules of appropriation. 78 In many western states, 
groundwater which is hydrologically connected to surface water is 
apportioned according to the water allocation rules for surface 
water.79 The remaining states require administrative coordination 
of groundwater withdrawals with surface water to avoid interfering 
with surface use of the water supply.80 
Ill. 
FEDERAL REGULATION OF GROUNDWATER 
A. In General 
No centralized federal authority regulates groundwater, despite 
considerable federal legislation applicable to groundwater. At least 
eight federal acts consider groundwater81 with EPA administering 
six of the eight statutes. 82 Most of the acts attempt to remedy con-
76. Trelease, supra note 76, at 1855-56. 
77. Id. at 1856. 
78. Id. at 1855. 
79. Id. at 1857. 
80. Id. at 1857-58. 
81. Marks, Toward a National Groundwater Act: Current Contamination and Future 
Courses of Action, 1987 FLA. B.J. 1, 11 (April 1987). The Director of Groundwater 
Programs lists 44 federal programs in some way governing groundwater. HENDERSON, 
supra note 1, at 35. 
82. The six programs administered by EPA are under the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA), § 1401, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), § 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response. 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988); Clean 
Water Act (CWA), § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), § 2, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988); and Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TOSCA), § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988). 
TOSCA, which regulates the use and disposal of chemicals that present an unreason-
able risk of injury to health or the environment, most frequently arises with the question 
of when state and local governments are preempted from regulating a substance which 
EPA has regulated under TOSCA. Courts addressing the issue have differed \videly on 
the preemptive effect of TOSCA. Compare Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Parish of St. 
16 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 9:1 
tamination after it has occurred rather than prospectively protect 
the quantity or quality of groundwater. 
Waste that is disposed of in landfills, waste that percolates into 
groundwater from above ground, or waste injected directly into 
groundwater cause most groundwater contamination. 83 The Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulates the gen-
eration, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of waste. 
Both RCRA and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) are 
designed to restrict land disposal of untreated waste and to contain 
releases from any unregulated land disposals. The Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) and to a more limited extent RCRA, are also directed toward 
cleanup of existing contamination. 
B. The Clean Water Act 
EPA has some authority under the Clean Water Act to take pre-
ventive action against groundwater contamination, but it has done 
very little due to conflicting court decisions and EPA's own hesi-
tancy to utilize the Act's provisions. The Act instructs EPA to de-
velop programs for "preventing, reducing, or eliminating the 
pollution of the navigable waters and ground waters, and improving 
the sanitary condition of surface and underground waters. . . . " 84 
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended that EPA 
regulate both surface and groundwater;85 specific provisions in the 
Act refer to the regulation of groundwater. 
Section 30386 of the Clean Water Act establishes water quality 
standards and designated uses for bodies of water in conjunction 
with section 30487 which establishes a methodology for criteria and 
James, 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985); Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F. Supp. 778 
(E.D.N.C. 1981), aff'd, 696 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1982) with Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. 
Sachs, 639 F. Supp. 856 (D. Md. 1986), rev'd, 802 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir. 1986); SED, Inc. 
v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Ohio 1981); Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. 
Township of Logan, 199 N.J. Super. 70, 488 A.2d 258 (1984). 
Beyond the scope of this analysis is regulation of nuclear disposal to prevent ground-
water contamination. The federal government has preempted state and local regulation 
of safety aspects of nuclear regulation, although state and local governments still retain 
their traditional authority over certain aspects of land use decisionmaking. See Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 
190 (1983). 
83. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.08[5]. 
84. CWA § 65, 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1988). 
85. MARKS, supra note 81, at 11 (citing 118 CONG. REC. H 33,766 (1972)). 
86. CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988). 
87. CWA § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1988). 
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information regarding the "factors necessary to restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of all navigable 
waters [and] groundwaters .... "88 Section 303 also authorizes EPA 
to require states to promulgate groundwater quality standards for 
those ground waters with a hydrologic nexus to surface waters. 89 
However, EPA has not promulgated the criteria or information re-
quired by section 304 and has neither regulated groundwater at the 
federal level, nor required states to do so. 90 EPA has also refused to 
extend the Clean Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System permits for point source discharges to discharges into 
groundwater,91 purportedly due to the legal problems in doing so. 
Nevertheless, EPA provides funding to state and local planning 
agencies for groundwater protection and management under section 
2050),92 but EPA's emphasis on groundwater preservation under 
the 1987 provision for state planning to control nonpoint source 
pollution remains uncertain. 93 
The relative dearth of regulation under the Clean Water Act is 
not entirely the fault of EPA. EPA's efforts in the 1970s to control 
deep-well disposal of wastes met with resistance, and its litigation 
was not always successful.94 As a result, EPA's power to regulate 
88. CWA § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1988). 
89. CWA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988). 
90. Some states have included groundwater quality standards in their state regula-
tions anyway. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 42. 
91. Marks, supra note 81, at 12 (citing EPA, Planning Workshop to Develop Rec-
ommendations for a Ground Water Protection Strategy, apps. vi-20, 21 (1980)). 
The statute's ambiguity may be traced to the history of the 1972 amendmen1S. An 
administration bill would have included coverage of groundwater, Federal Water Qual· 
ity Administration, Department of Interior, Clean Water for the 1970's: A Status Re-
port 16 (1970), and the legislative history includes argumen1S for a federal groundwater 
pollution control program. See, e.g., S. CoNF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 
(1972), reprinted in 1 CoMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE WATER POLLUTION CoNTROL Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 299 (1973); S. 
REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra, at 1470-71. 
The primary hurdle to explicit regulation of groundwater was the perception that 
such regulation would constitute federal land use planning. S. NOVICK, LAw OF ENvi-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION§ 13.01 [3) (1988). The resulting ambiguity in the 1972leg-
islation left both sides believing their position had prevailed. SeeS. REP. No. 414 at 98, 
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 1513. 
92. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 43. Section 205(j) of the Clean Water Act autho-
rizes EPA to provide gran1S to states for water quality management planning. 33 
u.s.c. § 1285 (1988). 
93. CWA § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1988); discussed in notes 84-94, supra, and ac-
companying text. 
94. For example, in United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 
1975), the court held that EPA lacked authority to regulate deep-well injection or any 
groundwater pollution not connected with surface water. When EPA responded later 
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groundwater, whether or not connected to surface water, is unclear. 
C. The Safe Drinking Water Act 
1. Maximum Contaminant Levels 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) is designed to assure the 
safety of water supplies for human consumption. Although the fed-
eral statute provides the strongest protection against groundwater 
contamination, the Act necessarily applies only to groundwater 
used as a source for drinking water. The SDWA protects drinking 
water (1) by controlling maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) and 
setting national standards to regulate the necessary purity level for 
drinking water, (2) by establishing a program to protect sole source 
aquifers (the primary source of drinking water for an entire commu-
nity), and (3) by creating a program to control underground injec-
tion of waste. Generally, to protect the quality of drinking water, 
EPA sets National Primary Drinking Water Standards for "public 
water systems" at a level that protects the public health. States may 
adopt their own standards so long as they are at least as stringent as 
the federal standards. After EPA approval of state standards, a 
state may assume responsibility for administering and enforcing the 
Act's requirements. 9s 
The Act's minimum standards apply only to "public water sys-
tems." A "public water system" is "a system for the provision to 
the public of piped water for human consumption, if such system 
has at least fifteen service connections or regularly serves at least 
twenty-five individuals."96 
by requiring permits for deep-well injunction with groundwater "associated" with sur-
face water, its approach was upheld by the Seventh Circuit of Appeals in United States 
Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977), but invalidated by the Fifth Circuit 
in Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977). 
95. SDWA § 1413, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (1988). 
96. SDWA § 1401(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4) (1988). Under this definition, "public" 
water systems can be privately owned. S. NoviCK, supra note 91, § 16.02[1]. Connec-
tions to homes or buildings are "service connections." /d. § 16.02[1]. "Public water 
systems" include "(A) collection, treatment, storage, and distribution facilities under 
control of the operator of such system and used primarily in connection with such sys-
tem, and (B) any collection or pretreatment storage facilities not under such control 
which are used primarily in connection with such system." /d. (citing SDWA 
§ 1401(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4) (1988)). Exempt from the definition is a system that has 
only distribution and storage facilities, obtains all its water from a public water system 
but is not owned or operated by it, does not sell water, and is not a carrier that conveys 
passengers in interstate commerce. SDWA § 1411, 42 U.S.C. § 300g (1988). 
EPA has administratively created three classes of public water systems. Community 
systems are systems that serve at least fifteen service connections used by year-round 
residents or that regularly serve at least twenty-five year-round residents. S. NoVICK, 
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EPA sets Primary and Secondary regulations for drinking water. 
The National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWRs) are 
enforceable standards to protect public health, while the National 
Secondary Drinking Water Regulations (NSDWRs) are unenforce-
able aesthetic standards to protect the public welfare. NPDWRs 
require compliance with Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) or 
treatment techniques for contaminants that may adversely affect the 
public health.97 A "contaminant" includes "any physical, chemi-
cal, biological, or radiological substance or matter in water;"98 and 
EPA may utilize treatment techniques whenever it is not "economi-
cally or technologically feasible" to determine the acceptable level 
of a contaminant.99 Water delivered to users may not exceed 
MCLs, although a public water system may use whatever method it 
chooses to comply with the MCLs. 1oo 
EPA is required to establish an NPDWR for any contaminant 
which "may have any adverse effect on the health of persons and 
which is known or anticipated to occur in public water systems." 101 
Under the 1986 amendments, EPA had to meet a schedule for regu-
lating eighty-three designated contaminants by June 19, 1989. 102 
supra note 91, § 16.02[2], (citing 40 C.F.R. § 141.2 (1988)). Community systems are 
required to meet all drinking water standards. Non-community systems are all other 
public water systems that serve twenty-five individuals at least sixty days per year. /d. 
These non-community systems have only been required to meet drinking water stan-
dards for certain toxic pollutants. 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.1 J(a)-(d}, 141.13, 141.14 (1988). 
One type of non-community system has recently been required to comply with primary 
drinking water standards. This type of system is the non-transient non-community 
water system; water systems serving at least twenty-five of the same individuals over six 
months per year. See 40 C.F.R. § 141.2 (1988}; 52 Fed. Reg. 25695, 25712 {1987}. 
97. SDWA § 1401(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300f(l). NPDWRs also include monitoring pro-
cedures for enforcement and may include requirements for minimum quality of intake 
waters and siting. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 16.03[1][a] (citing SDWA § 1401(1)(0), 
42 u.s.c. § 300f(l)(D} (1988}). 
98. SDWA § 1401(6), 42 U.S.C. § 300f(6) (1988}. 
99. SDWA § 1412(b)(7)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b}(7)(A} (1988}. 
100. SDWA § 1412(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6) (1988}. The exception to this 
flexibility is that systems may not use bottled water or point-of-use treatment devices to 
meet the MCLs. 52 Fed. Reg. 25701 (1987}. 
101. SDWA § 1412(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(A} (1988}. Therefore, EPA 
may regulate when there is a risk of adverse health effects. EPA has indicated that 11 
will establish an NPDWR for a contaminant when there are: "(1) analytical methods to 
detect a contaminant in drinking water; (2) sufficient health effects information to con-
clude that there may be a health concern; and (3} occurrence in drinking water or po-
tential for increased occurrence in drinking water." S. NovtcK, supra note 91, 
§ 16.03[1][b], (citing SO Fed. Reg. 46,940-41 (1985)); see also Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 824 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 
1987} (EPA can regulate contaminants even without a showing of "significant risk"). 
102. SDWA § 1412(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(l} (1988). The eighty-three con-
taminants are listed in two Advance Notices of Proposed Ru1emaking. See SDWA 
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The NPDWRs now require two treatment techniques: disinfection 
and filtration in public water systems in place of MCLs that are no 
longer feasible. 103 After January 1, 1988, EPA must also publish a 
triennial priority list of contaminants for regulation. 104 EPA must 
propose NPDWRs for at least twenty-five of the contaminants on 
the list within two years of that contaminant's listing and promul-
gate regulations within three years of a 1isting.105 In preparing the 
lists, EPA includes contaminants that appear frequently in ground-
water and for which there is sufficient information to evaluate any 
adverse effects on health.to6 
In regulating a contaminant, the EPA first sets an unenforceable 
Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (MCLG) where "no known or 
anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which 
allows an adequate margin of safety."107 The MCLG serves as the 
basis for establishing an enforceable Maximum Contaminant Level, 
which must be set as close as "feasible" to the MCLG.tos If an 
MCL is technologically or economically infeasible to monitor, treat-
ment techniques must substitute for the MCL. t09 
§ 1412(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1) (1988). This list of contaminants included 
twenty-two for which there were already NPDWRs, and EPA substituted seven con-
taminants for those on the list which it considered more dangerous. S. NoVICK, supra 
note 91, § 16.03[1][b]. The seven substituted contaminants may be found in 53 Fed. 
Reg. 1892 (1988). 
103. SDWA §§ 1412(b)(7)(c), (b)(8), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1(b)(2)(c), (b)(8) (1988). 
Disinfection is for systems using surface and ground waters, and filtration is for systems 
using surface water. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 16.03[1][d]. 
104. SDWA §§ 1412(b)(3)(A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(A)-(D) (1988). The first 
triennial list may be found in 53 Fed. Reg. 1892 (1988). 
105. SDWA § 1412(b)(3)(C), (D), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C), (D) (1988). EPA 
must consider for testing contaminants that are "known or anticipated to occur" in 
public water systems and that have an adverse effect on public health. S. NoVICK, supra 
note 91, § 16.03[1][b]. In determining occurrence of a contaminant in public water 
systems, EPA has taken the position that it may regulate contaminants that occur in 
any drinking water, including that in private wells, surface water, liquid or solid waste, 
and groundwater. 50 Fed. Reg. 46,941-43 (1985). 
106. 53 Fed. Reg. 1892-1902 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141). Hazardous 
substances under CERCLA and RCRA, as well as regulated substances under FIFRA 
have also been included in the tests. S. NoVICK, supra note 91, § 16.03[1][b]. 
107. SDWA § 1412(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4) (1988). 
108. SDWA § 1412(b)(4)-(5), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)-(5) (1988). In Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 824 F.2d 1211 
(D.C. Cir. 1987), the court upheld EPA's policy of setting an MCL of zero for probable 
animal or human carcinogens. For further elaboration on EPA's practice in setting 
MCL's, see 50 Fed. Reg. 46,944-51 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141). 
109. SDWA § 1401(l)(c)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1)(c)(ii) (1988). In determining 
whether an MCL is infeasible, EPA is to consider whether effective monitoring is tech-
nologically available and whether the frequency of monitoring required is economically 
feasible. H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1974). 
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MCLs and treatment techniques are designed to protect health to 
the extent "feasible," meaning the use of "the best technology, 
treatment techniques and other means which ... , after examination 
for efficacy under field conditions ... , are available (taking cost into 
consideration)."110 In short, water must be treated to control a reg-
ulated contaminant with the best available technology (BA T).11 1 
When EPA determines that a MCL has been exceeded, the agency 
must either commence a civil enforcement action or issue an admin-
istrative order if the violation continues for more than thirty days, 
and commence enforcement action immediately in states which lack 
enforcement authority.II2 
Less important secondary regulations are set to control contami-
nants affecting the odor, appearance, taste, or aesthetics of water. 113 
The SDWA requires EPA to notify a state when EPA determines 
that a system violates a secondary regulation because of the state's 
failure to take "reasonable action" to compel compliance. 114 The 
secondary standards may also be enforceable under state law. 115 
2. Wellhead Protection 
The 1986 amendments to SDWA establish two programs-the 
wellhead protection and the sole source aquifer demonstration pro-
grams-to protect groundwater. Previous attempts of legislating 
national groundwater quality standards failed to obtain Congres-
sional approval. 116 By June 1989, every state had to submit to EPA 
a program to protect "well head protection areas" 117 from contami-
nation. A "wellhead protection area" is "the surface and subsur-
face area surrounding a water well or wellfield (1) which supplies a 
public water system and (2) through which contaminants are rea-
sonably likely to move toward and reach such water well or well 
110. SDWA § 1412(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(5) (1988). 
111. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 16.03[1][d]. The legislative history indicates that 
the costs to be taken into consideration are the reasonable costs to large metropolitan or 
regional public water systems, and EPA has also considered total nntionv.ide costs of 
compliance. Id. 
112. SDWA § 1414(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(I)(B) (1988). There are limited 
prO\isions for variances and exemptions. See SDWA § 1415(a)(I)(A), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300g-4(a)(l)(A) (1988) (variances), and SDWA § 1416, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-5 (1988) 
(exemptions). 
113. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 16.03[3). 
114. SDWA § 1414(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(d) (1988). 
115. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 16.03 [3). 
116. D. STEVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAzARDOUS WASTE 
§ 7.04[3] (1988). 
117. SDWA § 1428(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a) (1988). 
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field." 118 Each state program must determine the boundaries of 
each wellhead protection area, identify all potential "anthropo-
genic" sources of contamination that may endanger public health, 
designate the state agency responsible for administering the pro-
gram, describe the program's methodology for protection, and pro-
vide contingency plans for alternative water supplies to 
contaminated water.119 
Every state program must be submitted to EPA for approval. 
EPA must respond within nine months of submission, 120 and if 
EPA disapproves, a state has six months to cure any defects. 121 
3. Sole Source Aquifer Demonstration Program 
The sole source aquifer demonstration program is a grant pro-
gram that reimburses states for fifty percent of their costs in devel-
oping and implementing state programs to identify and preserve 
"critical aquifer protection area[s]." 122 A "critical aquifer protec-
tion area" is generally either (1) an area which meets EPA's criteria 
for the susceptibility of the aquifer to contamination, the number of 
people using the groundwater as a drinking water source, and for 
the costs and benefits of protection, or (2) an area designated as a 
sole source aquifer for which an areawide groundwater protection 
plan was approved under section 208 ofthe Clean Water Act. 123 A 
state, municipal or local government, and regional planning entities 
with approval of the governor of the state may apply for these 
funds. 124 
The goal of a state comprehensive management plan is "to main-
tain the quality of the groundwater in the critical protection area in 
a manner reasonably expected to protect human health, the envi-
ronment and groundwater resources." 125 Each plan under section 
1427(b) must (1) contain a map outlining the boundaries of the pro-
tected areas, (2) identify sources of groundwater contamination, (3) 
assess the relationship between land activities and groundwater 
118. SDWA § 1428(e), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(e) (1988). 
119. D. STEVER, supra note 116, § 7.04[3][a], (citing SDWA § 1428(a)(l)·(6), 42 
U.S.C. § 300h-7(a)(1)-(6) (1988)). 
120. SDWA § 1428(c), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(c)(l) (1988). 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(c)(2) (1988). States that have more than 2500 active wells 
that reinject brines between the production, and surface casing of oil and gas wells must 
have a program as well to control such contamination. SDWA § 1428(i), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300h-7(i)(2) (1988). 
122. SDWA § 1427(c), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6G) (1988). 
123. SDWA § 1427(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6(b) (1988). 
124. SDWA § 1427(c), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6(c) (1988). 
125. SDWA § 1427(f), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6(f) (1988). 
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quality, (4) specify actions and management practices to prevent 
groundwater contamination, and (5) identify the authorities who 
will implement the plan, estimate its costs, and locate sources of 
state matching funds. 126 Programs can be adopted only after public 
hearings and federal consultation. 127 The Administrator of EPA 
must approve or disapprove an application for funding within 120 
days based on whether it satisfies the criteria for identification of 
critical protection areas and includes the elements necessary for a 
program under section 1427(b). 128 Federal funding for any one aq-
uifer may not exceed $4,000,000 in any single fiscal year. 129 
4. Underground Injection Control Program 
A third program under the SDWA which protects groundwater is 
the Underground Injection Control (UIC) program. The purpose 
of the program is to regulate deep-well injection of wastes into 
-"dry" wells. 13° Four types of regulations govern the UIC program: 
126. SDWA § 1427(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6(f)(1)(A)-(E) (1988). The Act specifies 
that the following may also be included in a state program: 
(A) A determination of the quality of the existing ground water recharged through 
the special protection area and the natural recharge capabilities of the special protec-
tion area watershed, 
(B) Requirements designed to maintain existing underground drinking water qual-
ity or improve underground drinking water quality if prevailing conditions fail to meet 
drinking water standards, pursuant to this chapter and State law. 
(C) Limits on Federal, State, and local government, financially llSSisted activities 
and projects which may contribute to degradation of such ground water or any loss of 
natural surface and subsurface infiltration of purification capability of the special pro-
tection watershed, 
(D) A comprehensive statement efland use management including emergency con-
tingency planning as it pertains to the maintenance of the quality of underground 
sources of drinking water or to the improvement of such sources if necessary to meet 
drinking water standards pursuant to this chapter and State law. 
(E) Actions in the special protection area which would avoid adverse impacts on 
water quality, recharge capabilities, or both. 
{F) Consideration of specific techniques, which may include clustering, transfer of 
development rights, and other innovative measures sufficient to achieve the objectives 
of this section. 
(G) Consideration of the establishment of a State institution to facilitate and llSSist 
funding a development transfer credit system. 
(H) A program for State and local implementation of the plan described in this 
subsection in a manner that will insure the continued, uniform, consistent protection 
of the critical protection area in accord with the purposes of this section. 
(0 Pollution abatement measures, if appropriate. 
42 U.S.C. § 300h 6(f)(2)(A)-(E) (1988). 
127. SDWA § 1427{h), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6(h) (1988). 
128. SDWA § 1427(i), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6(i) (1988). 
129. SDWA § 1427(j), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6G) (1988). 
130. See STEVER, supra note 116, § 7.04[4][a]. "Underground injection" is defined 
as "the subsurface emplacement of fluids by weU injection" and does not include "un-
24 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 9:1 
(1) general criteria and performance standards; (2) standards and 
procedures for approval of state programs; (3) provisions from state 
programs approved in whole or in part by EPA; and (4) procedural 
and substantive permit requirements administered by EPA in states 
lacking approved programs. 131 The extent of regulation of a deep 
injection well depends upon which of the five regulatory categories 
best describe it. Class I wells are those used by hazardous waste 
generators, owners or operators of hazardous waste treatment, stor-
age, and disposal facilities as defined by the regulations under 
RCRA, 132 and other industrial and municipal injection wells. 133 
Class II wells include wells used by the petroleum industry for con-
ventional oil and gas extraction. 134 Class III wells are those used by 
the mining and power generation industries. 135 The most extensive 
standards and criteria apply to wells in Classes I through 111.136 
Class IV wells are those in which radioactive or hazardous waste is 
injected above or into a formation with an underground source of 
drinking water within a quarter mile of the well. 137 The 1984 
amendmdent to RCRA prohibits all such wells. 138 Finally, Class V 
wells include "cesspools and septic systems serving multi-family or 
industrial structures, drainage wells, and assorted other wells."139 
The owner or operator of a Class V well must identify the well to 
the director of the applicable state program. The director must 
then complete a study of the well's potential for contamination 
within three years of EPA's approval of the state program. 140 
Those states with approved programs administer the require-
ments for each class of regulated well through a permit system, 141 
derground injection of natural gas for purposes of storage." SDWA § 142l(d), 42 
u.s.c. § 300h(d) (1988). 
131. STEVER, supra note 116, § 7.04[4][a], (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 146, pt. 145, pt. 147, 
and pts. 144, 146, and 147 respectively (1988)). 
132. See infra notes 154-269 and accompanying text. In a 1984 amendment to the 
RCRA, disposal of hazardous waste by injection is prohibited into or above a formation 
that is within one quarter mile an underground source of drinking water. The amend· 
ment was self-executing, except in states with more stringent UIC requirements prior to 
May 8, 1985, and except for reinjections of treated groundwater pursuant to 11 response 
action under CERCLA. See STEVER, supra note 116, § 7.04[4][a] n.l48. 
133. 40 C.F.R. § 146.5(a) (1988). 
134. 40 C.F.R. § 146.5(b) (1988). 
135. 40 C.F.R. § 146.5(c) (1988). 
136. 40 C.F.R. § 146.9(b) (Class I), § 146.9(c) (Class II), § 146.9(d) (Class III) 
(1988). 
137. 40 C.F.R. § 146.5(d) (1988). 
138. See supra note 132. 
139. STEVER, supra note 116, § 7.04(4][a], (citing 40 C.F.R. § 146.05(e)). 
140. 40 C.F.R. § 146.52 (1988). 
141. SDWA § 1422,42 U.S.C. § 300h-1 (1988). "Any person" may petition EPA to 
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and may impose requirements more stringent than the federal 
UIC. 142 EPA may not enforce the Act's requirements directly in a 
state that has an approved program without thirty days notice to 
the state of an alleged violation. 143 After such notice, EPA may 
issue an administrative order. 144 If a state does not have an ap-
proved program, EPA administers the UIC regulations, and can is-
sue an administrative order without prior notice, or seek civil or 
criminal judicial relief against violators. 14 5 
Excluded from regulation under the UIC program are aquifers 
that are not then or in the future suitable for water supply, and 
aquifers that are "mineral, hydrocarbon or geothermal energy pro-
ducing, or are capable of becoming commercially mineral or hydro-
carbon energy producing."146 States are also authorized to devise 
special programs for "the underground injection of brine or other 
fluids which are brought to the surface in connection with oil or 
natural gas production or natural gas storage operations, or ... any 
underground injection for the secondary or tertiary recovery of oil 
or natural gas .... " 147 Such programs need not meet the require-
ments for the state's general UIC program but must meet certain 
procedural requirements for a permit system 148 and be "an effective 
program (including adequate record keeping and reporting) to pre-
vent underground injection which endangers drinking water 
require a permit in an area of a state or states for deep well injection pending an ap-
proved state program. EPA may also so designate an area upon a determination that 
the area has one aquifer which is "the sole or principal drinking water source for the 
area and which, if contaminated, would create a significant hazard to public health." 
SDWA § 1424(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(a)(l) (1988). 
142. SDWA § 1422(b)(l)(B)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(b)(l)(B) (1988). Basically, the 
permit program must ensure that underground injection will not endanger drinking 
water sources. For the definition of endangerment of drinking water, see Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 824 F.2d 1258, 26 
E.R.C. 1233 (1st Cir. 1987) (court upheld EPA's allowing contamination within dispo-
sal area, but struck down EPA's allowance of contamination outside the disposal area in 
concentrations greater than the SDWA requirements). 
143. SDWA § 1423(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(a)(l) (1988). 
144. The maximum administrative penalty is $125,000, with a maximum of SJO,OOO 
per day of violation ($5000 per day for petroleum extractors). An appeal of an adminis-
trative order must be made to the district court for the District of Columbia. SDWA 
§ 1423(c), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c) (1988). 
145. SDWA § 1423(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b) (1988). Civil remedies include injunc· 
tive relief and penalties of up to $25,000 per day; criminal punishment includes impris-
onment for not more than three years, fines or both for "willful" violations. /d. 
146. 40 C.F.R. § 146.4 (1988). 
147. SDWA § 1425(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4(a) (1988). 
148. These requirements are set out in SDWA § 142J(b)(J)(A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. 
300(h)(b)(l)(A)-(D) (1988). 
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sources."149 
Because EPA does not extensively regulate Class I and V wells, 
Congress amended the SDWA in 1986.150 Under the amendments, 
by January 1988, EPA had to identify methods for groundwater 
monitoring at Class I wells to provide the earliest possible detection 
of migration into or towards drinking water. 151 The amendments 
also required EPA to report to Congress on the number and catego-
ries of Class V wells discharging nonhazardous waste into or above 
an underground source of drinking water, the primary contamina-
tion problems associated with each category, and recommendations 
for minimum design, construction, installation, and siting require-
ments to prevent such contamination. 152 Finally, a 1984 amend-
ment to RCRA requires that EPA reconsider allowing injection of 
cyanides, heavy metals, acids, polychlorinated biphenyls, ha-
loginated organics, solvents, and dioxins before August 1988, and 
prohibit injection of these wastes after that date unless EPA deter-
mines that continued injection will not endanger public health 
under the criteria set forth in the amendment.ts3 
D. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
1. In General 
In part, Congress intended the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA) to strengthen the weak land use requirements 
to remedy groundwater contamination by nonpoint source pollu-
tion imposed on the states under section 208 of the Clean Water 
Act. 154 Yet, by 1984, it was clear that RCRA could not effectively 
protect groundwater from ongoing waste disposal. The "natural 
implication" of RCRA's amendments in 1984 was that "ground-
water would be protected, regardless of cost,"155 and that both 
RCRA and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
149. SDWA § 1425(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4(a) (1988). 
Underground injection endangers drinking water sources if such injection may re-
sult in the presence in underground water which supplies or can reasonably be ex-
pected to supply any public water system of any contaminant, and if the presence of 
such contaminant may result in such system's not complying with any national pri-
mary drinking water regulation or may otherwise adversely affect the health of 
persons. 
SDWA § 142l(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d) (1988). 
150. STEVER, supra note 116, § 7.04[4][a]. 
151. SDWA § 1426(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5(a) (1988). 
152. SDWA § 1426(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5(b) (1988). 
153. RCRA § 3004(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(f) (1988). 
154. See S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.01[3]. 
155. /d. 
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sation and Liability Act (CERCLA or the "Superfund" Act) were 
as much groundwater protection statutes as waste disposal laws. 
The Solid Waste Disposal Act (SDWA), of which RCRA is a 
part, regulates "solid waste," broadly defining the term to include 
what is commonly considered solid waste as well as liquids and con-
tained gases. 156 Under SWDA, states have the responsibility for de-
vising two types of state management plans---<me for solid waste 
disposal and another for hazardous waste disposal. For solid waste 
disposal, EPA must promulgate criteria for state plans, and specifi-
cally consider: 
the varying regional, geologic, hydrologic, climatic and other circum-
stances under which different solid waste practices are required in or-
der to insure the reasonable protection of the quality of the ground 
and surface waters from leachate contamination, the reasonable pro-
tection of the quality of the surface waters from surface runoff con-
tamination, and the reasonable protection of ambient air quality. 157 
The plans must distinguish between "sanitary landfills" and open 
dumps, prohibit the establishment of new open dumps, and require 
that all solid waste be utilized for resource recovery, disposed of in 
sanitary landfills, or be "otherwise disposed of in an environmen-
tally sound manner." 158 All existing open dumps must either close 
or upgrade and become sanitary landfills. 159 Once a state plan is 
approved by EPA, the state is eligible for federal financial assistance 
to implement the plan and for resource conservation planning and 
demonstration projects. 160 Despite these requirements, little money 
has been appropriated and the process can only be enforced through 
withholding financial assistance to recalcitrant states. 161 As a re-
sult, regulation of solid waste disposal continues to be a local con-
cern of towns, municipalities, and counties. 
Under RCRA, hazardous waste is a type of solid waste, and 
156. RCRA § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(27) (1988). "Solid waste" is defined as 
" ... any garbage. refuse. sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment 
plant, or air pollution control facility and any other discarded material, including solid, 
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, 
mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities .... " /d. 
157. RCRA § 4002(c)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 6942(c)(1) (1988). 
158. RCRA § 4003(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(2) (1988). 
159. /d.§§ 4003(a), 4005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6943(a)(3), 6945(a) (1988). EPA establishes 
criteria to distinguish between open dumps and sanitary landfills. At a minimum, such 
criteria must provide that a facility is a sanitary landfill only if "there is no reasonable 
probability of adverse effects on health or the environment from disposal of solid waste" 
at the facility. RCRA § 4004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6944(a) (1988). 
160. RCRA §§ 4007-4008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6947(b)-6948 (1988). 
161. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.02[2][b][ii]. 
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therefore includes "discarded" materials that may be solid, liquid, 
or gaseous. 162 RCRA defines hazardous waste broadly as solid 
waste which may "cause, or significantly contribute to an increase 
in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating 
reversible, illness; or ... pose a substantial present or potential haz-
ard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, 
stored, transported or disposed of, or otherwise managed."163 EPA 
will consider a waste to be hazardous if EPA lists it as such, or if 
tests demonstrate the waste to be hazardous. 164 Any solid waste 
generated from treatment, storage, or disposal of listed hazardous 
waste is also considered hazardous. 165 Every generator must test all 
its own waste to determine if it meets the criteria for hazardous 
waste. 166 Hazardous waste regulations continue to apply even when 
the waste is mixed with nonhazardous waste, unless the mixture 
162. See supra note 156. Discarded materials may be those that are released into the 
environment if not promptly recovered, byproduct materials stored more than ninety 
days, materials accumulated for recycling, and some recovered or recycled materials. 
40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2), (b), (c) (1989). 
163. RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988). There are statutory exclusions 
for sewage, irrigation return flows, industrial point source discharges by permit under 
the Clean Water Act, and regulated nuclear materials. RCRA § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6903(27) (1988). Household wastes are also excluded, RCRA § 3001(i), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6921(i) (1988), as are mining wastes, RCRA §§ 1006(c), 3001(b)(3)(A)(ii), 3005(f), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6905(c), 6921(b)(3)(A)(ii), 6925(f) (1988). Pending study by EPA, also ex-
cluded are wastes from power production, oil and gas drilling, and cement kilns. 
RCRA § 3001(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(A) (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4(b)(5), 
261.4(b)(8) (1989). See generally STEVER, supra note 116, § 5.02[2][d], [e]. 
164. S. NoviCK, supra note 91, § 13.03[1][b][i]. 
165. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2) (1989). The procedure for designation of hazardous 
wastes is complex. First, there are criteria in RCRA that trigger consideration of a 
waste as hazardous if there is some hazard to health or the environment. See RCRA 
§ 3001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 (1989). There are then two 
sets of criteria for listing (or delisting) such wastes as hazardous; criteria EPA uses to 
list types of waste as hazardous, 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.11,261.20 (1989), and criteria each 
generator must use to determine whether a particular allotment of waste is hazardous, 
40 C.F.R. §§ 261.11, 261.20 (1989). Common to both sets of criteria are four character-
istics: "ignitiability," "reactivity," "EP toxicity," and "corrosivity." 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 261.21-.24; see S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[1][b][i][B]. In listing a waste as 
hazardous, EPA also considers additional criteria in 40 C.F.R. § 261.11 (1989). A 
waste must be listed if it meets any of the criteria in 40 C.F.R. § 261.11 ( 1989), unless it 
falls within an exception provided in 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(3) (1989). EPA may also 
classify wastes as hazardous under the regulations by applying the general hazard crite-
ria in RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(b) (1989). 
The governor of a state may petition EPA to identify or list a waste as hazardous. 
RCRA § 3001(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(c) (1988). Also, any person may petition EPA to 
exempt from a listed waste a waste produced by a particular generator. 40 C.P.R. 
§ 260.22 (1989). 
166. 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (1989). 
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does not meet the criteria for hazardous waste.t67 
The purpose of RCRA's permit system is to provide a "cradle to 
grave" system of documentation for identifying hazardous waste 
and controlling its treatment, storage, and disposal. Any facility 
that handles hazardous waste is either (1) a generator, (2) a trans-
porter, or (3) a treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facility, with 
each type of operation subject to its own set of regulations. Genera-
tors are regulated to insure that no hazardous waste goes unidenti-
fied, transporters to insure that hazardous waste is identified as such 
and safely transported, and treatment, storage, or disposal sites to 
insure that no hazardous wastes release into the environment. 
Every generator168 must first determine if a waste is hazardous 
and, if so, notify EPA or the relevant state agency. 169 A manifest-
a shipping document meeting national standards including among 
its requirements identifying the waste and its source170-must ac-
company wastes shipped off-site, and a generator must keep records 
of all notices, manifests, and reports. 171 Treatment, storage, or dis-
posal facilities that accept wastes must return a copy of the manifest 
to the generator, who must store the document and/or report any 
failure to receive the manifest. 172 Each generator must have a plan 
for minimizing waste production. 173 For accumulated waste, the 
generator must meet minimum standards for design and operation, 
use suitable containers, and train and employ personnel to respond 
to emergencies. 174 Where the accumulated waste exceeds certain 
limits, the generator becomes a storage facility and must then meet 
the additional requirements of the Act for such a facility.m Gener-
ators may still store and handle waste for brief designated periods of 
time without becoming a storage facility.1 76 Generators that dis-
pose of their wastes at land disposal facilities must first determine 
whether the wastes are eligible for land disposal without dilution. 
Special exemptions apply to small quantity generators. Congress 
167. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iii) (1988). 
168. "Generator" is not defined in the statute, but is defined in the regulations as 
"any person, by site, whose act or process first causes a hazardous waste to be subject to 
regulation." 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 (1988). Importers and exporters of hazardous waste 
are deemed generators. 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.10(c), 262.50 (1989). 
169. 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (1989). 
170. 40 C.F.R. § 262 (1989). 
171. 40 C.F.R. § 262.40 (1989). 
172. 40 C.F.R. § 262.42 (1989). 
173. RCRA § 3002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (1988). 
174. 40 C.F.R. § 262.34 (1988). 
175. 40 C.F.R. § 262.34 (1988). 
176. 40 C.F.R. § 263.12 (1988). 
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removed a very broad exemption for all small quantity generators, 
leaving only three categories of small quantity generators: (1) gener-
ators of between 100 and 1000 kilograms per month; (2) generators 
of less than 100 kilograms per month; and (3) generators of acutely 
hazardous waste of one kilogram or less in any one month or of up 
to 100 kilograms of soil or debris contaminated with acutely haz-
ardous waste. 177 The first category is subject to the requirements 
that apply generally to all generators, but can store waste for a 
longer period without becoming a storage facility. 178 Generators in 
the second category are exempt from regulation as generators as 
long as they meet certain additional conditions. 179 The third cate-
gory of generator is also exempt from the regulations applicable to 
large quantity generators, but must send its acutely hazardous 
waste to state licensed facilities.tso 
Transporters receive identification numbers and must also carry 
the generator's manifests with every shipment of hazardous waste, 
identify the waste, and deliver the manifest with the waste to the 
ultimate destination. 181 The transporter must also notify EPA or 
the state agency of hazardous waste delivered before the manifest 
system was operational,182 if the transporter chose the destination. 
The Department of Transportation regulates the transportation of 
hazardous waste more rigorously than RCRA.IBJ 
177. See S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[3)[a][iii]. 
178. Wastes may be stored for up to 180 days if the quantity of waste does not 
exceed 6000 kilograms. If the waste must be sent more than 200 miles off-site for treat· 
ment, storage or disposal, the waste may be stored for up to 270 days. 51 Fed. Reg. 
10,175 (1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 262.34(d), (e) (1988)). 
179. 40 C.F.R. § 262.34(b) (1988). The exemption applies month by month. The 
generator must test the wastes to ensure that none are acutely hazardous (thus placing 
the generator into the third category) or accumulated beyond the limits to qualify for 
the second category. The generator must send acutely hazardous waste to a permitted 
facility, a reclamation facility, or another facility licensed by the state for solid waste. 
The generator may not mix the wastes with used oil or with fuel for burning without 
complying with the regulations applicable to large quantity generators. See S. NOVICK, 
supra note 91, § 13.03[3][a][ii], (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 10,174, 10,175 (1986) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 261.5(b), (h) (1988))). 
180. 51 Fed. Reg. 10,174 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(f)(3)(ii) (1988)). 
181. 40 C.F.R. § 262 (1988). 
182. There are criminal penalties for failure to give such notice. CERCLA 
§ 103(c)(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c)(d) (1988). 
183. 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-179 (1988). 
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By far, RCRA reserves its most comprehensive regulations for 
treatment, 184 storage,185 and disposal186 facilities. The Act prohib-
its the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste at a "facil-
ity"187 without a permit under RCRA or approval by EPA of 
"interim status." If the owner and operator do not obtain a permit 
from EPA, or a designated state agency if the state has an approved 
program, 188 the facility cannot operate.189 
To expedite approval of state programs, EPA provided "interim 
authorization" for "substantially equivalent" state programs until 
January 31, 1986.190 Under the 1984 amendments, however, EPA 
could contract with states without authorized programs. 191 These 
contracts generally consisted of administering other requirements of 
the federal program. 192 In addition, state laws which are more 
stringent than the federal requirements or which go beyond the 
184. "Treatment" is defined in the statute as: 
any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to change the 
physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any hazardous waste so 
as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste nonhazardous, safer for 
transport, amenable for recovery, amenable for stomge, or reduced in volume. Such 
term includes activity or processing designed to change the physical form or chc:mtcal 
composition of hazardous waste so as to render it nonhazardous. 
RCRA § 1004(34), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (1988). 
185. "Storage" is defined as "the containment of hazardous waste, either on a tern· 
porary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of 
such hazardous waste." RCRA § 1004(33), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33) (1988). 
186. The definition of "disposal" provides: 
The term 'disposal' means the discharge, deposit. injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, 
or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that 
such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the en\"iron· 
ment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground 
waters. 
RCRA § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988). 
187. "Facility" is not defined in the Act. There is a decidely unhelpful definition m 
the regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10(a) (1988). It has been suggested that the definition 
refers to land, structures, and appurtenances within property boundaries. See S. 
NovtcK,supra note 92, § 13.03[2][a]; STEVER, supra note 117, § S.OS(2][b), and author· 
ities cited therein. 
188. RCRA § 300S(c), 42 U.S.C. § 692S(c) (1988). EPA must approve a state pro-
gram if it is equivalent to the federal program, consistent with programs in other states, 
and there is adequate assurance the plan will be enforced. RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6926 (1988). Once a program is approved or "authorized," the state agency enforces 
the program in lieu of EPA. RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988). EPA has 
concurrent authority to enforce the state program's requirements. RCRA § 3008, 42 
u.s.c. § 6928 (1988). 
189. RCRA §§ 300S(a), 3008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 692S(a}, 6928 (1988). 
190. RCRA § 3006(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(c) (1988). 
191. RCRA § 3006(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(c)(3) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 271.126 
(1988). 
192. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03(4][a][i]. 
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scope of RCRA are not preempted. 193 The result of this overlap-
ping system of regulation is that a program in any given state under 
RCRA may have as many as four components, including a state 
authorized program, a program contracted to the state by EPA, a 
program administered directly by EPA, and state program require-
ments not preempted by RCRA.t94 
All owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities in exist-
ence on November 19, 1980 had to submit the first part of a permit 
application to EPA or the authorized state. 195 The second part of 
the application, a detailed form, had ~o be completed by November 
8, 1985 or within twelve months of a facility becoming regulated 
under RCRA, whichever occurred later.196 New facilities must ob-
tain permits prior to construction, 197 but the second part of their 
application need not be submitted until EPA so requires. 19B Per-
mits last up to ten years, with review provided after five years. 199 
Because of the long time necessary to review permit applications, 
RCRA granted "interim status" for existing facilities that had sub-
mitted the first part of the application.200 Under the 1984 amend-
ments, existing facilities had to complete the first part of the 
application and meet interim status standards for groundwater 
monitoring and financial responsibility by November 8, 1985.201 
Interim status was limited to four years for land disposal facilities in 
existence on November 8, 1984 and eight years for all other facili-
193. See RCRA § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988). State and local land usc regula-
tions governing siting, for example, are not preempted by RCRA. 
194. S. NoviCK, supra note 91, § 13.03[4][a][ii]. After notice and comment proce-
dures, EPA also has the authority to revoke authorization of a state progam which is 
not being administered or enforced in accordance with EPA guidelines. RCRA 
§ 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1988). 
195. 40 C.F.R. § 270.10 (1988). Facilities closed before July 26, 1982 do not have to 
complete their application, but facilities closed after that date do have to do so and 
continue surveillance and corrective action for the period of the permit. 40 C.F.R. 
§ 270.1(c). "Part A" of the application forms requires only a general description of the 
facility and its activities. 40 C.F.R. § 270.13. 
196. RCRA § 3005(e)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(3) (1988). 
197. RCRA § 3005(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1988). 
198. 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(e)(4) (1988). 
199. RCRA § 3005(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c); 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.41, 270.50 (1988). 
Permits may be modified, suspended, or revoked by EPA. RCRA § 3005(c), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6925(c); 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.41, 270.50 (1988). EPA must provide public notice and an 
opportunity to comment on every application. A hearing may be requested with admin-
istrative appeals within EPA and ultimately judicial review. 40 C.F.R. § 270 (1988). 
With state issued permits, state law controls the availability of administrative and judi-
cial review. 40 C.F.R. § 271.124(c). 
200. RCRA § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1988). 
201. RCRA § 3005(c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(2)(C) (1988). 
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ties.202 All interim status facilities must maintain records for in-
spection,203 meet the requirements of the Act for closure, provide 
evidence of insurance, maintain security, and demonstrate financial 
ability to comply with closure and post-closure requirements. The 
interim status facilities must also monitor groundwater quality, 
remedy whenever it exceeds acceptable levels,204 and maintain sur-
veillance for years after closure and longer if a permit requires cor-
rective action. 
Facility permits consist of general requirements for all facilities, 
categorical requirements for the relevant category of facility, and, 
frequently, specific requirements for the licensed facility negotiated 
with EPA or the state agency.205 The general requirements include 
minimum design standards, operating requirements, evidence of fi-
nancial responsibility, liability insurance against third party claims 
for physical injury and property damage, and closure and post-clo-
sure requirements. 206 
Subpart ? 7 imposes stringent groundwater monitoring require-
ments. EPA had administratively excluded some interim status fa-
cilities,208 but a 1984 amendment requires that surface 
impoundments, landfills, land treatment units, and waste-pile units 
that receive hazardous waste after July 26, 1982 meet the ground-
water monitoring requirements.209 A groundwater monitoring sys-
tem must be maintained during the active life of the facility. 
Facilities required to do "detection monitoring"210 must continue 
that monitoring during the post-closure period of approximately 
thirty years.211 In addition, facilities compelled to do "compliance 
monitoring"212 or take "corrective action"213 must do so for any-
where from a number of years after the active life of the facility to a 
time when the groundwater protection standard214 has not been ex-
202. RCRA § 3005(c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(2)(C) (1988). 
203. RCRA § 3005(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 265 (1988). 
204. RCRA, § 3005(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 265 (1988), see also S. 
NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[4][c]. 
205. S. NoVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[4][e]. 
206. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 264 (1988). 
207. Exemptions from Subpart Fare contained in 40 C.F.R. § 264 (1988). 
208. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[4][e][v]. 
209. RCRA § 3005(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(i) (1988). 
210. See supra notes 209 & 212 and accompanying text. 
211. 40 C.F.R. § 264.90(a)(2) (1988). 
212. 40 C.F.R. pt. 264 (1988). 
213. 40 C.F.R. pt. 264 (1988). 
214. "Groundwater protection standards" are defined as "conditions ... designed to 
ensure that hazardous constituents ... entering the ground water ... do not exceed the 
concentration limits ... in the uppermost aquifer underlying the ... area beyond the 
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ceeded for three consecutive years.215 If the facility has not con-
taminated the groundwater, its permit will specify "(1) the location 
where monitoring samples must be taken and at which the facility's 
'groundwater protection standard' applies; (2) the hazardous con-
stituents which the facility must monitor; (3) the 'concentration 
limits' applicable to the hazardous constituents the facility must 
monitor; and (4) other groundwater protection requirements."216 
The facility must also conduct "compliance monitoring," and, if the 
level of contamination exceeds the "ground water protection stan-
dard," corrective action must follow,2 17 unless the measurement is 
the result of erroneous sampling, analysis, or evaluation, or the con-
tamination is from an unregulated source.218 Compliance monitor-
ing ordinarily involves drilling monitoring wells to determine if the 
groundwater protection standard has been exceeded.219 
EPA's categorical requirements have focused on land disposal, 
where the various disposal methods harm groundwater the most. 
To prevent contamination, EPA and Congress have restricted dis-
posal of liquids in landfills, established performance standards to 
prevent leakage, and phased out land disposal of many hazardous 
substances. With the exception of nonhazardous liquids where "no 
present rush" of contaminating groundwater or soil exists, 220 the 
1984 amendments require EPA to prohibit disposal of absorbent 
materials in containers at landfills if the materials can release liquids 
point of compliance ... .'' 40 C.F.R. § 264.92 (1988). It has been suggested, however, 
that the term's definition when referring to the requirement of compliance monitoring 
indicates "the concentration limits that must not be exceeded at the point of compli· 
ance, and other limits and monitoring points designed to detect migration of contami· 
nated groundwater." S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[4][e][v] n.231. 
215. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[4][e][v] (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.90(c), 
264.96 (1988)). 
216. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[4][e][v]. The hazardous substances for 
which the facility must monitor will depend upon which substances have been identified 
in the aquifer in sampling prior to permit issuance and which substances are being dis-
posed which EPA determines are likely to reach groundwater. Jd., (citing 40 C.F.R. 
§ 264.93(b), (c)(l988)). The maximum concentration levels are determined by up gradi· 
ent well sampling and analysis prior to permit issuance, except for fourteen heavy met· 
als and pesticides for which EPA has established limits. 40 C.F.R. § 264.94(a)(2) 
(1988). EPA or the state may require "alternate concentration limits" that are higher 
than the concentration limits if they do not create a "substantial present or potential 
hazard to human health or the environment ... .'' 40 C.F.R. § 264.94(a)(3), (c) (1988). 
Alternate concentration limits are based in part on the quantity of groundwater and the 
direction of the flow. 40 C.F.R. § 264.94(b)(1)(iii) (1988). 
217. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.91(a)(2), 264.100 (1988). 
218. 40 C.F.R. § 264.99 (i), (j) (1988). 
219. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.03[4][e][v] (citing 40 C.F.R. § 264.99(a), (b) 
(1988)). 
220. RCRA § 3004(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c) (1988). 
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when degraded or crushed.221 The Act also imposes mmunum 
technological requirements which reflect "improvements in the 
technology of control and measurement."222 For new facilities re-
ceiving a permit application after November 8, 1984 and for expan-
sions of existing landfills and surface impoundment units, RCRA 
requires: (1) at least two liners, with a system to collect liquid 
above and between the liners, and (2) monitoring of groundwater 
for leaks.223 EPA can waive the requirement of liners if the facil-
ity's operator can demonstrate that "alternative design and operat-
ing practices, together with location characteristics, will prevent the 
!pigration of any hazardous constituents into the ground water or 
surface water at least as effectively as such liners and leachate col-
lection systems. "224 
The 1984 amendments also phase out land disposal on an auto-
matic schedule which establishes by categories of waste a date on 
which land disposal is prohibited.225 The ban automatically takes 
221. RCRA § 3004(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c) (1988). 
222. RCRA § 3004(o), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o) (1988). 
223. RCRA § 3004(o)(I)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(I)(A) (1988). 
224. RCRA § 3004(o)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(2) (1988). 
225. See RCRA § 3004(d)-(g); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(d)-(g). The schedule is as follows: 
I. A group of chlorinated hydrocarbons, listed as FOOI-F005 and very common m 
groundwater, were banned from land disposal effective November 8, 1986. There IS a 
two year extension for small-generated wastes, wastes of less than I% of the solvents. 
and discarded and off-specification products. Superfund and RCRA cleanup wastes. 
and wastes disposed in injection wells, have until 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e) (1988). 
2. Dioxin contaminated waste is banned from land disposal effective November 8, 
1988. Much of the waste is from CERCLA actions. Dioxin wastes disposed of in injec-
tion wells is subject to a later date discussed below. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e) (1988). 
3. Wastes listed in California Department of Health Services regulations to be 
banned- the so-called "California test"- were banned effective November 8. 1987. 
The list includes liquid hazardous wastes contaminated with designated levels of cya-
nide, toxic heavy metals, PCB's and total halogenated organic compounds, and wastes 
which are strongly acidic. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d}(2) (1988). 
4. For wastes disposed of in injection wells by August I, 1988, EPA must detennine 
whether injection of the above described wastes adequately protect health and the en\i-
ronment, taking into consideration the prohibition on migration from the disposal site. 
If EPA determines it is not, deep well injection of these wastes must be prohibited. The 
definition of "deep injection well" excludes wells under section 6939h(a). 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6924(f) (1988). 
5. CERCLA and RCRA cleanup soil and debris contaminated with solvents. di-
oxin, California list wastes, and solvent wastes are subject to the land disposed prohibi-
tion on November 8, 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(f) (1988). 
6. All other listed hazardous wastes as of November 8, 1984 are divided into three 
groups with land disposal bans effective on August 8, 1988, June 8, 1989, and June 8, 
1990. 
If EPA misses the 1988 or 1989 deadline, wastes in the first and second category of all 
other listed hazardous wastes may only be disposed of in facilities that meet the mini-
mum chronological requirements for new facilities, and only if there is no practical 
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effect unless EPA either (1) adopts regulations prescribing treat-
ment standards for the category of waste based on the best available 
and demonstrated treatment technology,226 or (2) allows land dis-
posal to continue based on a finding "to a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty, that there will be no migration of hazardous constituents 
from the disposal unit or injection zone for as long as the wastes 
remain hazardous."227 Thus, in most cases, if EPA does not pub-
lish regulations establishing treatment standards by the day the rele-
vant land disposal goes into effect, the disposal prohibition 
automatically takes effect.228 For wastes listed as hazardous after 
November 8, 1984, EPA must determine within six months of list-
ing or identifying the waste whether land disposal adequately pro-
tects health and the environment and, if not, promulgate 
regulations prohibiting land disposaJ.229 
2. RCRA Enforcement and Liability 
The regulatory sections of RCRA discussed thus far focused on 
prevention of contamination. Only one section of RCRA, section 
alternative. RCRA § 3004(g)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(6) (1988). S. NoVICK, s11pra note 
91, § 13.03[5](a][iii][B], (citing RCRA § 3004(e)), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e) (1988); 51 Fed. 
Reg. 40,572 (codified at 40 C.P.R. §§ 268.30, 31, and 51 Fed. Reg. 19,300 (1986)). 
226. RCRA § 3004(m), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m) (1988). Treatment technology which 
creates greater risks than those ofland disposal is not deemed "available." 51 Fed. Reg. 
40,572, 40,592 (1986). These treatment standards are promulgated in 40 C.P.R. pt. 
268, subpt. D (1988). 
BOAT must have been demonstrated in use, not in bench or pilot projects. BOAT 
also requires an evaluation of availability based on whether risks to health and the en vi· 
ronment from discharges from such treatment exceeds the risks of untreated land dispo· 
sal. 51 Fed. Reg. 40,572, 40,588, 40,592 (1986). The most common types of treatment 
are thermal treatment and tank treatment. SeeS. NoviCK, s11pra note 91, § 13.03[5][C]. 
227. RCRA § 3004(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). The ex-
emption may be granted on petition by any interested person. RCRA §§ 3004(d)(l), 
(e)(1), (g)(5), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(d)(1), (e)(1), (g)(5) (1988); cf. RCRA § 3004(f)(2), 42 
U.S.C. § 6924(f)(2) (1988). EPA has stated that it expects few exemptions will be 
granted. 51 Fed. Reg. 40572, 40576, 40582 (1986). There are also exemptions for some 
surface impoundments. 52 Fed. Reg. 40,572, 40,639 (1986) (codified at 40 C.P.R. 
§ 268.4 (1988)). 
There are also three types of variances which EPA may grant. EPA may give exten· 
sions in the general deadlines not to exceed two years. RCRA § 3004(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6924(h)(2) (1988). There may be site-specific variances for up to one year. RCRA 
§ 3004(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(h)(2) (1988). See also 51 Fed. Reg. 40,572, 40,639 
(1986) (codified at 40 C.P.R. § 268.5 (1988)). The third type of variance is a fundamen· 
tally different factor (FDF) variance from treatment standards. 51 Fed. Reg. 40,642 
(1986). 
228. RCRA § 3000(m)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)(2) (1988). 
229. RCRA § 3004(g)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(4) (1988). EPA fails to make the 
decision within six months, there is no automatic ban that takes effect as with other 
wastes. RCRA § 3004(g)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(4)(C) (1988). 
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7003, addresses the issue of contamination that has already oc-
curred. Whenever past or present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste "may 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment," the Administrator of EPA may sue in district court 
any past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or 
disposal facility, any past or present generator, and any past or pres-
ent transporter who has contributed or is contributing to such han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal, to compel 
corrective action. 230 Owners and operators of land disposal facili-
ties and some storage facilities may even be required to take correc-
tive action beyond facility boundaries if necessary to protect public 
health and the environment, and if offsite landowners give the 
owner or operator permission to undertake the action.2l 1 Under 
EPA's regulations, any significant increase in groundwater contami-
nation by any of a list of designated pollutants, or any hazardous 
waste at the site, requires cleanup. Cleanup must continue until 
MCLs are met, or, if impractical, until alternate concentration 
levels are met.232 Section 7003 has become somewhat less impor-
tant following RCRA's regulatory expansion to require cleanup of 
contamination and CERCLA's creation of a fund for cleaning up 
abandoned sites. 
Although some courts have held that section 7003 applies to in-
active sites,233 most hold that the section is not retroactive in appli-
cation because it is designed to remedy only present and ongoing 
conditions.234 It is clear that section 7003 imposes strict liability as 
a matter of federallaw235 even without a showing that the defend-
ant violated a regulatory requirement of RCRA.236 Although 
courts disagree on whether traditional common law prerequisites to 
equitable relief such as balancing the equities are necessary, the bet-
ter view is that Congress intended that the "imminent and substan-
230. RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988). 
231. RCRA § 3004(v), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(v) (1988). 
232. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.05(4][a]. 
233. United States v. Northeastern Phannaceutical & Chern. Co., Inc. 810 F.2d 726 
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 
734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
234. United States v. Northeastern Phannaceutical & Chern. Co., Inc. 810 F.2d 726 
(8th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 
734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
235. United States v. Northeastern Phannaceutical & Chern. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 
734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
236. United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
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tial endangerment standard" authorize broader relief.237 Persons 
acting in a corporate capacity may also be individually liable if they 
are personally involved in, or directly responsible for, the conduct 
violating section 7003.238 
Courts have also split on whether there is joint and several liabil-
ity under section 7003 for injunctive relief.239 For several years 
courts struggled with the showing necessary to demonstrate immi-
nent and substantial endangerment. In one influential case, the 
court held that the relevant factors included the degree and nature 
of toxicity of the contaminant and the likelihood of human or envi-
ronmental exposure absent corrective action.240 However, courts 
have held that the standard is lower than the common law require-
ment of actual harm, since only a risk of harm need be 
demonstrated. 241 
The regulatory requirements of RCRA are enforceable through 
civil, administrative, criminal,242 and citizen suit remedies. Section 
3008(a) provides for judicial and administrative enforcement of the 
Act's requirements.243 EPA may issue a compliance order (which 
may include administrative penalties), seek injunctive relief, or im-
pose civil penalties.244 EPA's enforcement powers, however, are 
relatively unimportant in states with authorized programs contain-
ing a wide variety of enforcement procedures and sanctions.245 
237. Compare United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) with United States 
v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal 
Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 513, 535 (1984). 
238. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 
726, 745 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). 
239. See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 
1985); United States v. Stringfellow, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 20385 (C.D. Cal. 
1984). 
240. United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980). 
241. United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 168 (4th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982). 
242. Criminal penalties are found in RCRA § 3008(d) & (e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) & 
(e) (1988), which includes a heavy penalty in section 3008(e) for "knowing endanger-
ment" as defined in section 3008(f). 
243. RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988). 
244. RCRA § 3008(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1988). The 1984 amendments 
required compulsory termination of authorization for land disposal facilities that had 
filed Part B of the permit application and certified compliance with the groundwater 
monitoring and financial responsibility. RCRA § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1988). 
RCRA permits require cleanup of all releases of hazardous waste or constituents from 
solid waste, RCRA § 3004(u), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988), and EPA may order correc-
tive action at interim status sites if a release of hazardous waste into the environment 
occurs, RCRA § 3008(h), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1988). 
245. See S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.06[l][b]. 
1990] GROUNDWATER AND LAND USE 39 
3. Leaking Underground Storage Tanks Program 
In the early 1980's, EPA discovered that a widespread cause of 
groundwater contamination was leaking underground storage 
tanks. Gasoline tanks, buried to lessen the risk of fire and explo-
sion, leaked into drinking water supplies.246 The exclusion of petro-
leum products from Superfund prevented EPA from conducting 
cleanup of such contaminated groundwater.247 Leaking under-
ground tanks of solvents, particularly trichlorethylene, could be 
cleaned up, but remained unregulated by RCRA because they con-
tained a product, not wastes.248 Amendments in 1984 and 1986 cre-
ated a new program in Subtitle I of RCRA-the leaking 
underground storage tank program, known as the "LUST" 
program. 249 
The LUST program requires EPA to set national performance 
criteria for buried tanks containing "regulated substances"2S0 in or-
der to prevent corrosion and structural defects. States may admin-
ister the program through EPA-approved plans, and there is a fund 
for cleanup of abandoned petroleum tanks. 
Owners of existing tanks, of tanks taken out of service after 1973, 
and of new tanks brought into operation after November 8, 1985, 
must send notice to state agencies regarding the tanks, including 
their age, size, type, location, and use.251 Persons who deposit regu-
lated substances in underground tanks must also inform tank own-
ers of the owners' obligation to provide notice for a period 
beginning thirty days after EPA prescribes the form of the owners' 
notice, and running for eighteen months thereafter.252 Further-
more, any person who sells a new tank must inform the buyer of the 
notice obligation beginning thirty days after the criteria for new 
tank performance are promulgated. 253 
The definition of "underground tank" includes "any one or com-
bination of tanks (including underground pipes connected thereto) 
which is used to contain an accumulation of regulated substances, 
246. ld. § 13.04[1]. 
247. CERCLA §§ 101(14), 104(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9604(a)(2) (1988). 
248. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.04[1]. 
249. RCRA §§ 9001-9008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-69911 (1988). 
250. "Regulated substance" includes all hazardous substances covered under CER-
CLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), and petroleum. RCRA § 9001(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6991(2) (1988). 
251. RCRA § 9002(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a)(2) (1988); 50 Fed. Reg. 46,602 
(1985). 
252. RCRA § 9002(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a)(5) (1988). 
253. RCRA § 9002(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a)(6) (1988). 
40 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 9:1 
and the volume of which (including the volume of the underground 
pipes connected thereto) is ten per centum or more beneath the sur-
face of the ground."254 Excluded from the definition are farm or 
residential tanks of 1,100 gallons or less, tanks used for storing heat-
ing oil that is consumed on the premises, septic tanks, designated 
pipeline facilities, surface impoundments, pits, ponds or lagoons, 
storm water or waste water collection systems, flow-through pro-
cess tanks, liquid traps or associated gathering lines directly related 
to oil and gas operations, and storage tanks in an underground area 
situated on or above the surface of the floor.255 In 1987 each state 
had to prepare inventories of underground tanks containing regu-
lated substances-one for tanks containing petroleum and another 
for those containing hazardous wastes.2s6 
RCRA requires EPA to promulgate criteria for leak detection, 
corrective measures, cleanup, closure, and financial responsibilities 
to protect human health and the environment. In promulgating the 
regulations, EPA may distinguish between categories based on age, 
use, location, industry practice, and the "technical capability" of 
owners and operators.257 All tanks must meet the criteria of section 
9003(c). New tanks brought into use on or after the date the crite-
ria are promulgated must also meet performance standards, not yet 
promulgated, concerning, among other things, design, construction, 
installation, release detection, and compatibility standards.258 Until 
issuance of the new performance standards, no person may install 
an underground tank not designed and built to specifications to 
"prevent releases due to corrosion or structural failure for the oper-
ational life of the tank. "259 
States have the primary responsibility for enforcement of the 
LUST program. States may prepare programs that meet federal cri-
teria, 260 but need not submit the programs to EPA for approval. If 
a state does not have an adequate program, EPA administers the 
254. RCRA § 9001(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1) (1988). 
255. RCRA § 9001(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1) (1988). 
256. RCRA § 9002{c), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(c) (1988). 
257. RCRA § 9003(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(b) (1988). 
258. RCRA § 9003(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(e) (1988). 
259. RCRA § 9003(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(g) (1988). State programs may be stricter 
than the federal requirements. RCRA § 9004(b), 42 U.S.C. § 699lc(b) (1988). 
260. The program must include the following and provide for adequate enforcement: 
(1) requirements for maintaining a leak detection system, an inventory control sys-
tem together with tank testing, or a comparable system or method designed to identify 
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Act's requirements.261 The states and EPA have concurrent en-
forcement authority. Thus, if EPA discovers a violation, it may is-
sue an administrative order or commence a civil action and 
administratively or judicially assess civil penalties of up to $25,000 
per day for noncompliance. 262 If the violation occurs in a state with 
an adequate program, EPA must give notice to the state prior to 
issuing an order or bringing suit. 263 
Under the criteria required for state programs,264 each state pro-
gram must have requirements for corrective action to respond to a 
release into the environment and for closure to prevent future re-
leases. 265 Programs must also have requirements for maintaining 
evidence of financial responsibility for corrective action and com-
pensation to third parties for "bodily injury and property damage 
caused by sudden and nonsudden accidental releases arising from 
operating an underground tank. . . . "266 
A "mini-Superfund" was also established for cleanup of soil and 
releases in a manner consistent with the protection of human health and the environ· 
ment; 
(2) requirements for maintaining records of any monitoring or leak detection sys-
tem or inventory control system or tank testing system; 
(3) requirements for reporting of any releases and corrective action taken in re-
sponse to a release from an underground storage tank; 
(4) requirements for taking corrective action in response to a release from an un· 
derground storage tank; 
(5) requirements for the closure of tanks to prevent future releases of regulated 
substances into the environment; 
(6) requirements for maintaining evidence of financial responsibility for taking cor-
rective action and compensating third parties for bodily injury and propeny damage 
caused by sudden and nonsudden accidental releases arising from operating an under-
ground storage tank; 
(7) standards of performance for new underground storage tanks; and 
(8) requirements -
(A) for notifying the appropriate State agency or department (or local agency or 
department) designated according to section 699la(b)(l) of this title of the existence 
of any operational or non-operational underground storage tank; and 
(B) for providing the information required on the form issued pursuant to sec-
tion 699la(b )(2) of this title. 
RCRA § 9004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 699lc{a) (1988). 
261. See RCRA § 9006(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(a)(l) (1988). 
262. RCRA § 9006(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(a)(3) (1988). 
263. RCRA § 9006(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(a)(2) (1988). 
264. See supra note 260. 
265. RCRA § 9004(a)(4), (5), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(a)(4), (5) (1988). 
266. RCRA § 9004(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 699lc(a)(6) (1988). EPA may, but is not re-
quired to, have such requirements. RCRA § 9003(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(c)(2) 
(1988). 
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groundwater from leaking underground petroleum tanks.267 EPA, 
or a state in a cooperative arrangement with EPA, may use the 
LUST fund to remedy contamination from underground liquid pe-
troleum or petroleum product storage tanks when the owners and 
operators cannot be found to pay the costs, when the owners and 
operators have inadequate financial assurances to pay the costs, or 
when prompt action is "necessary" to protect health or the environ-
ment.268 EPA must give priority to sites which pose the greatest 
threat.269 
D. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) 
The purpose of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)270 is not to prevent 
groundwater and soil contamination but to remedy contamination 
after it has occurred. Whenever there is a "release"271 of a hazard-
267. Cleanup of leakages of hazardous waste from underground tanks is covered by 
CERCLA. See infra notes 270-332 and accompanying text. 
268. RCRA § 9003(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(2) (1988). 
269. RCRA § 9003(h)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(3) (1988). 
270. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
271. "Release" is defined as: 
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, 
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the aban· 
donment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing 
any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release 
which results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim 
which such persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions 
from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline 
pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials 
from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
[42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], if such release is subject to requirements with respect to 
financial protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under section 
170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. 2210], or, for the purposes of section 9604 of this title or 
any other response action, any release of source byproduct, or specical nuclear mate-
rial from any processing site designated under section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this 
title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer. 
CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982), as amended by Superfund Amend-
ment and Reeuthorization Act (SARA) § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988). Re-
leases must be of "hazardous substances," defined to include most substances 
designated as hazardous or toxic under other environmental statutes. CERCLA 
§ 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). Petroleum and petroleum products are ex-
cluded. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14) (1988). A private party with a 
permit under a federal environmental statute is not liable for response costs attributable 
to "federally permitted releases." CERCLA § 101(10), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10) (1988). 
Releases of substances regulated under FIFRA in accordance with federally registered 
label directions are similarly excluded. CERCLA § 107(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988). 
For other exclusions, see CERCLA § 101(10), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)(B) (1988) (vehi-
cle exhaust emissions and pipeline pumping station emissions); and CERCLA 
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ous substance, a substantial threat of a release of a hazardous sub-
stance, or a release or threat of release of a "pollutant or 
contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial dan-
ger to the pubic health or welfare," EPA may respond under Sec-
tion 104 by taking a "removal"272 or a "remedial"273 action.274 
Procedures for both response and removal actions are detailed in a 
§ 104(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3) (1988) (farm products, natural substances, and re-
leases into water supplies from ordinary system deterioration are exempt from releases 
to which EPA may respond). 
Proof of a release requires a showing of contamination of soil or water in or near the 
site. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., v. Environmental Protection Agency, 822 F.2d 132 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
272. The terms "remove" and "removal" are defined as: 
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substan~ from the environment. such 
actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hnzardous 
substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess. 
and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of 
removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, 
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, 
which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in 
addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, 
provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of 
threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604{b) 
of this title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.). 
CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). 
273. A "remedy" or "remedial action" is an action 
consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions 
in the event of a release or threatened release of hazardous substan~ into the envi-
ronment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substan~ so that they do 
not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or 
the environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions nt the location 
of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or 
ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substan~ and asso-
ciated contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation 
of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking contain-
ers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of 
alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such 
actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment. The terms include 
the costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities 
where the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, 
such relocation is more cost-effective than and environmentnlly preferable to the 
transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition off-site of hazard-
ous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or welfare; 
the terms includes off-site transport and off-site storage, treatment, destruction, or 
secure disposition of hazardous substan~ and associated contaminated materials. 
SARA§ 101(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (24) (1988). 
274. SARA § 104(a)(b)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988). The showing of an "immi-
nent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare" is only necessary for re-
leases or substantial threats of release of "pollutants or contaminants," not for 
hazardous substances. 
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National Contingency Plan.275 Both actions aim to clean up con-
tamination, particularly when no responsible parties are legally re-
quired to perform the cleanup or responsible parties cannot be 
found. To finance cleanup, CERCLA established a revolving trust 
fund (the "Superfund"), funded by general revenues and taxes on 
petrochemical feedstocks, crude oil, and general corporate in-
come.276 The fund may be reimbursed for response costs by "re-
sponsible parties" for the contamination. If responsible parties 
refuse to reimburse the fund, EPA can file suit. States, local gov-
ernments, and private parties who conduct cleanups may also be 
reimbursed either by the Superfund or directly from responsible 
parties. 277 
Any person with a known, suspected, or likely release of a haz-
ardous substance into air, water, soil, or groundwater must give no-
tice to the EPA or face criminal penalties. 278 EPA has compiled a 
list of sites from these notice reports and from states, members of 
Congress, private citizens, and its own investigations; the list is 
known as the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-
tion and Liability Information System (CERCLIS).279 Each site on 
the list received a preliminary assessment to determine whether 
EPA has jurisdiction and whether there was a release or is a sub-
stantial threat of a release of a hazardous substance or "imminent 
and substantial danger" from a contaminant allowing EPA to con-
duct a cleanup of the site. 280 Based on a site inspection, EPA deter-
mines whether a removal or long-term remedial action is necessary. 
If a remedial action is necessary, EPA must first rank the site on the 
National Priority List. For responses financed by the Superfund, 
the actual cleanup may be done by EPA, by a state or local govern-
ment in agreement with EPA, or by a private party. 
Among the factors EPA considers in determining whether re-
275. SARA§ 105,42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). The procedures are set out in 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 300 (1987). 
276. CERCLA § 111,42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). The fund was set at not more than 
8.5 billion dollars for 1986 to 1991. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). 
277. SARA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (1988). 
278. CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1988). 
279. See generally S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.05[3][a]. 
280. See discussion infra. By January 1, 1988, EPA had to have conducted a prelim-
inary assessment for all sites listed on Comprehensive Environmental Response Com-
pensation and Liability Information System (CERCLIS) on October 17, 1986. The next 
step after finding federal jurisdiction is for EPA to conduct a site assessment to evaluate 
whether the site poses an "imminent and substantial danger." All site inspections for 
sites listed in CERCLIS on October 17, 1986 are to be completed by January 1, 1989. 
SARA§ 116, 42 U.S.C. § 9616 (a) (1988). 
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moval is appropriate is whether nearby populations will be exposed 
to the hazardous materials through food or drinking water unless 
removal action is taken. 281 EPA may go beyond monitoring and 
assessing a release to removal action "as may be necessary to pre-
vent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare 
or to the environment"282 when there is danger of actual injury.283 
The distinction between what constitutes a removal and what a re-
medial action is blurry, especially after a 1986 amendment requiring 
that removal actions "contribute to the efficient performance of any 
long-term remedial action" when "practicable."284 A typical reme-
dial action is soil and groundwater cleanup.285 On-site treatment of 
wastes is preferred;286 wastes may be transferred offsite only to TSD 
facilities that comply with RCRA and all other applicable state and 
federal requirements. 287 
CERCLA broadly authorizes remedial actions, only prescribing 
that such actions "prevent or minimize the release of hazardous 
281. 40 C.F.R. § 300.65(b)(2) (1988). The factors to be considered are: 
(i) Actual or potential exposure to hazardous substances or pollutants or contami· 
nants by nearby populations, animals, or food chain; 
(ii) Actual or potential contamination of drinking water supplies or sensitive eco-
systems: 
(iii) Hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants in drums, barrels, tanks, 
or other bulk storage containers, that may pose a threat of release; 
(iv) High levels of hazardous substances or pollutants or contnminants in soils 
largely at or near the surface, that may migrate; 
(v) Weather conditions that may cause hazardous substances or pollutants or con· 
taminants to migrate or be released; 
(vi) Threat of fire or explosion; 
(vii) The availability of other appropriate Federal or State response mechanisms to 
respond to the release; 
(viii) Other situations or factors which may pose threats to public health or welfare 
or the environment. 
282. CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). 
283. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.05[3][a][i]. 
284. CERCLA § 104(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a){2) (1988). 
285. SeeS. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.05[3][a][ii]: 
Such cleanup is often protracted and expensive, and very little experience was avail-
able before CERCLA. EPA has been feeling its way into the new technology. At a 
typical site, extensive explorations are needed to establish the location of aquifers and 
the extent of contamination. Wells may be drilled to pump up groundwater for treat· 
ment and to prevent further spread of contaminants. Trenches may be excavated and 
a permeable barrier installed down to bedrock. The site may be capped v.ith asphalt 
to prevent infiltration of rainwater. A treatment facility may be constructed on site. 
Arrangements may be made for off-site disposal of the residue of contnminants ex-
tracted from groundwater. Such remedies may take years to plan, design, and carry 
out. 
286. ld. 
287. CERCLA § 121, U.S.C. § 9621 (1988). 
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substances so that they do not migrate or cause substantial danger 
to present or future public health or welfare or the environment."288 
EPA only engages in remedial actions at sites on the National Pri-
orities List and must rank all releases on the list in order of prior-
ity.289 To rank sites, EPA must consider their 
relative risk ... taking into account to the extent possible the popula-
tion at risk, the hazard potential of the hazardous substances at such 
facilities, the potential for contamination of drinking water supplies, 
the potential for direct human contact, the potential for destruction of 
sensitive ecosystems, the damage to natural resources which may af-
fect the human food chain and which is associated with any release or 
threatened release, the contamination or potential contamination of 
the ambient air which is associated with the release or threatened re-
lease, State preparedness to assume State costs and responsibilities, 
and other appropriate factors. . . . 290 
EPA then delineates the techniques for remedial actions.291 Due to 
concern that the ranking undervalued the threat from contaminated 
groundwater, a 1986 amendment to CERCLA required EPA to 
give high priority to health risks from contamination of drinking 
water.292 
The first step in a remedial action consists of two studies: a "re-
medial investigation" which evaluates the nature of and danger 
from contamination, and a "feasibility study" which evaluates po-
tential remedies.293 EPA must consult with the state containing a 
contaminated site before selecting a remedy.294 The state must 
agree to provide at least ten percent (fifty percent for some sites 
under state ownership )295 the initial cleanup costs and to assume 
288. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988). 
289. CERCLA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). Section 116 in 1986 established a 
schedule for remedial actions. CERCLA § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 9616 (1988). 
290. CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (1988). 
291. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). 
292. CERCLA § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1988). Congress also required a health 
assessment of substances found at listed sites by the Agency for Toxic Substance and 
Disease Registry in the Department of Health and Human Services. CERCLA § 104(i), 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1988); see also S. NovicK, supra note 91, § 13.05(3)[f][i]. 
293. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(d) (1988). The so-called "RI/FS" includes data on the air, 
soil, surface water and groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the site. S. 
NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.04[3][f][ii][A). 
By October 17, 1989, EPA must begin at least 275 new RI/FSs, and complete studies 
and begin construction on 175 facilities before October 1989 and another 200 facilities 
by October 1991. CERCLA § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 9616 (1988). 
294. CERCLA § 104(c)(2), (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2), (3) (1988). 
295. CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(C)(i), (ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(C)(i), (ii) (1988). States 
must pay the 50% when a state or political subdivision operated the site at the time of 
disposal. CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(C)(ii) (1988). States who 
1990] GROUNDWATER AND LAND USE 47 
responsibility for maintenance costs incurred after the first ten years 
of groundwater treatment.296 Cleanup must comply with state envi-
ronmental quality or facility siting standards if the state standards 
are stricter than the federal requirements. 297 EPA must publish no-
tice of its final remedial plan, provide an opportunity for public 
comment and a public hearing, and publish notice of its final 
plan.29s 
Responsible parties may be permitted or required to assist in car-
rying out the remedial plan. A responsible party is prohibited from 
undertaking any remedial action without EPA authorization at a 
site where EPA or another responsible party under an administra-
tive order or consent decree has begun a remedial action and feasi-
bility study.299 EPA may grant releases and enter into partial 
settlement with responsible parties.300 Among other restrictions, 
remedial plans are to give preference to on-site treatment over land 
disposal as "[t]he offsite transport and disposal of hazardous sub-
stances or contaminated materials without such treatment should 
be the least favored alternative remedial action where practicable 
treatment technologies are available."301 
As of November 8, 1988, RCRA's prohibition against disposal on 
land of untreated waste applies to wastes generated in CERCLA 
cleanups. After November 8, 1988, on-site treatment that is the 
best demonstrated available treatment technology must be used. 302 
Groundwater cleanup must make the water meet the SDWA's Max-
imum Contaminant Levels303 or, if no MCLs have been established, 
acquired property through bankruptcy or foreclosure are not considered the owner or 
operator of the property. CERCLA § 101(20)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) 
(1988). 
296. CERCLA § 104(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (1988). Beginning in 1989, stales must 
also give assurances of off-site disposal availability if needed. CERCLA § 104(c)(9), 42 
U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988). Each state may participate in selecting sites for the Na-
tional Priorities List. A state must also concur with deletion of a site from the National 
Priorities List which EPA claims to have cleaned up. CERCLA § 121(f)(1)(C), 42 
U.S.C. § 962I(f)(1)(C) (1988). 
297. CERCLA § 121(d)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). 
298. CERCLA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1988). 
299. CERCLA § 122(e)(6}, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) (1988). 
300. CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988). 
301. CERCLA § 121(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(l) (1988). 
302. CERCLA § 121(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1988). 
303. Section 12l(d)(2)(B)(ii) assumes the use of alternate concentration levels when 
groundwater cannot be restored to MCL levels, but prohibits their use by a process that 
"assumes a point of human exposure beyond the boundary of the facility," unless the 
routes of exposure through groundwater are known and the remedial measures will 
preclude human exposure. CERCLA § 12l(d)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(B)(ii) 
(1988). 
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standards in any other applicable federal statutes.304 
Section 106(a) empowers the federal government to sue to abate 
any "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health 
or welfare or the environment" caused by an "actual or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance from a facility."305 The govern-
ment also may issue administrative orders under Section 106 "as 
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the envi-
ronment."306 EPA must provide notice and an opportunity for in-
formal public participation in its selection of remedies under 
Section 106.307 The exact interrelationship between Section 106 
and Section 107 is unclear,308 although it is doubtful that Section 
106 can be used remedially as a basis for reimbursement of remedial 
costs for complete cleanup. 
Section 107(a) delineates the potentially responsible parties 
(PRPs) for cleanup costs under CERCLA. The first category of 
PRPs includes, generally, any owner or operator of a vessel or "fa-
cility".309 Persons who were owners and operators of a facility at 
the time of disposal of any hazardous substance are also potentially 
304. CERCLA § 121(d)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(i) (1988). EPA may 
depart from any applicable standards only if compliance would pose even greater risks 
to human health and the environment, would be technically impracticable, or if the 
costs of compliance for cleanup financed from the Superfund are out of balance with 
other demands on the Superfund. CERCLA § 121(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 962l(d)(4) 
(1988). 
305. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). States may participate in 
EPA's settlement negotiations under section 106 and not concur in the settlement, enti· 
tling the state to intervene in the federal enforcement suit to argue against the consent 
decree. CERCLA § 121(f)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 962l(f)(2)(B) (1988). 
306. CERCLA § 106(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). An emerging judicial view is 
that there need not be a hearing on a section 106 administrative order to satisfy due 
process but the defendant may challenge the order and assert a good faith defense in 
judicial enforcement of the order. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736 (D. 
Kan. 1985); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412 (D. Minn. 
1985); Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 25 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1758 (W.D. Mo. 1985). But see Industrial Park Dev. Co. v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 604 F. Supp. 1136 (B.D. Pa. 1985). 
307. CERCLA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1988). 
308. STEVER, supra note 116, § 6.05[2)[c]. 
309. "Facility" is defined as: 
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any 
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, im· 
poundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, 
or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, dis-
posed of, or placed, or otherwise come to.be located; but does not include MY con· 
sumer product in consumer use or any vessel. 
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988); see also State of New York v. General 
Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (broad definition of facility). "Vessel" is 
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responsible.310 Also included within responsible parties are persons 
who arranged for transportation of hazardous substances, or ar-
ranged for treatment or disposal of hazardous substances owned or 
possessed by them at a facility for which response actions are re-
quired.311 Transporters who accept or accepted hazardous sub-
stances for transport to a facility selected by them constitute the 
final category of PRPs. 312 
Responsible parties may be compelled by injunction to assist in a 
response.313 All responsible parties are strictly as well as jointly and 
severally liable314 for all response costs and damage to natural re-
defined in CERCLA § 101(28), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(28) (1988), to include most water-
craft. 
Federal facilities are covered by CERCLA, but the Superfund may not be used to 
finance cleanup of contaminated federal sites, CERCLA §§ 11l(e)(3}, 120(a)(1)(2), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 96ll(e)(3), 9620(a)(1)(2) (1988). EPA was required to establish a list of fed-
erally owned remedial sites and determine which sites should be included on the Na-
tional Priority List by April 17, 1988. CERCLA § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1988). 
So-called "innocent" owners of facilities from which there is a release or threatened 
release may have a defense under section 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(8)(1988). If an 
owner acquires property without "reason to know" that hazardous substances were dis-
posed on-site there is no liability under section 101(35). However, to utilize this de-
fense, the party must have "undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate 
inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent \vith good com-
mercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability." CERCLA § 101(35), 
42 u.s.c. § 9601(35)(8) (1988). 
310. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
311. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988). 
To obtain response costs against a generator, it must be demonstrated that the gener-
ator's hazardous substances were shipped to the facility, the generator's substances or 
substances like them are present at the site, and there was a release or threatened release 
of any hazardous substance at the site that necessitated the response. United States v. 
South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984). 
It is not a defense that: (1) the generator sold the substances to a third party who 
disposed of them, United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985); (2) the 
generator shipped the waste to a site other than the contaminated site. Missouri v. In-
dependent Petrochem. Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mo. 1985); or (3) that the generator 
shipped only a de minimis amount of the substance to the site, United States \'. Conser-
vation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). But see Walls v. Waste Re-
sources Corp., 640 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co .• 634 F. 
Supp. 800 (D. Idaho 1986). 
312. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). 
313. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
314. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Ottati & 
Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v. Shell Oil Co .• 605 F. 
Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. 
Ohio 1983). There is a statutory right of contribution among parties who are "liable or 
potentially liable under section 9607(a)." CERCLA § 113(f)(1). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) 
(1988). 
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sources without reference to respective degrees of fault. 315 
Under Section 107(a),316 responsible parties are strictly liable317 
for: (1) federal and state response costs pursuant to Section 104 that 
are "not inconsistent with" the National Contingency Plan; (2) any 
"other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person 
consistent with" the National Contingency Plan;318 (3) damages for 
injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the 
costs of assessing the loss;319 and (4) the costs of health assess-
ments320 performed at the site by the Agency for Toxic Disease 
Registry.321 The only statutory defenses to liability are that the sole 
cause of the release or threatened release was an act of God, an act 
of war, or an act or omission of a third party.322 To assert the latter 
defense, the party must demonstrate that there was no "contractual 
relationship"323 between the potentially responsible party and the 
third party (unless the third party is a railroad) and that the PRP 
exercised due care with regard to the substances and took precau-
tions against "foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party 
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts 
or omissions. " 324 
The procedures and substance of administrative and judicial set-
tlements between EPA and potentially responsible parties is set out 
315. It is not necessary to prove that the party's own hazardous substances were 
released or caused the release. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984). As with section 7003 of RCRA, section 107 of 
CERCLA has been upheld against claims of retroactivity. United States v. South Caro-
lina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., supra; United States v. Northeastern Phannaceutica1 & 
Chern. Co., Inc. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987) (al· 
lowing federal government to recover costs incurred prior to effective date of CER· 
CLA). Northeastern Pharmaceutical also held that a plant manager that had arranged 
for disposal could be held personally liable under 107(a)(3). 
316. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
317. See, e.g., J.V. Peters & Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 767 F.2d 263 
(6th Cir. 1985); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
318. The terms "not inconsistent with" costs for response costs of government and 
"consistent with" for other response costs is deliberate and involves different burdens of 
proof for claimants. SeeS. NovtcK, supra note 91, § 13.06[3][a]. 
319. CERCLA §§ 107(a)(4)(A)·{C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)·(C) (1988). 
320. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (1988). 
321. See S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.06[3][a]. 
322. CERCLA § 107{b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). There are also specified limita· 
tions on the amount of liability that do not apply in certain instances of serious and 
willful violations. See CERCLA § 107(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2) (1988). 
323. "Contractual relationship" is defined in CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(35) (1988). 
324. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). 
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in Section 122.325 There are separate statutes of limitations for cost 
recovery, contribution actions, natural resource damages actions, 
and a variety of other CERCLA-based suits.326 Section 109327 con-
tains sanctions for violations of the following other sections: 103; 
108; 122 (relating to administrative orders, consent decrees, and or-
ders to carry out settlement agreements); and 120 (relating to the 
failure of federal facilities to carry out agreements with EPA for 
remedial action). CERCLA also provides general criminal 
sanctions. 328 
Federal agencies, state agencies, and Indian tribes who are trust-
ees for natural resources are entitled to recover either the value of 
the damaged resources or the costs of restoration of resources 
threatened with irreversible loss. 329 Persons other than state or fed-
eral governments may recover their costs of cleanup directly from 
responsible parties or from the Superfund, but not do both. 330 All 
government response costs must be consistent with the National 
Contingency Plan and private parties' costs must be approved 
before expenditure as consistent with the Plan.331 Persons who in-
cur cleanup costs pursuant to a Section 106(a) order may seek reim-
bursement from the Superfund and statutory interest.332 
IV. 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR GROUNDWATER 
CONTAMINATION 
A private party damaged by groundwater contamination may 
pursue statutory remedies under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
RCRA and/or CERCLA, or seek injunctive relief and damages 
through state common law claims. Under the SDWA citizen suit 
325. CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988)); see also STEVER, supra note 117, 
§ 6.09[4][e][iii]. 
326. CERCLA § 113(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1988). 
327. CERCLA § 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a) (1988). 
328. CERCLA § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 9609 (1988). 
329. CERCLA § 1ll(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 96ll(b)(1) (1988). There may only be re-
covery from the Superfund for natural resource damage if there is a threat of irrevers· 
ible damage to natural resources subsequent to the adoption of a plan. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 96ll(i) (1988). 
330. CERCLA § 112(b), (f), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b), (f) (1988). 
331. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988); United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 
484 u.s. 848 (1987). 
332. CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1988). If the claim on the Superfund 
is rejected, the claimant may sue for recovery in federal district court and in addition 
seek costs and fees under subsections (a) and (d) of section 2412 of title 28. /d. 
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provision, any person may bring a civil action in federal district 
court against anyone in violation of the Act or regulations (includ-
ing the United States and individual states) to compel compli-
ance.333 A citizen suit may also be brought to compel EPA to 
perform a nondiscretionary duty under the Act. 334 Sixty days no-
tice prior to commencement of the suit notice must be given to 
EPA, the alleged violator, and the state where the alleged violation 
occurred.335 A citizen suit may not be brought if the United States 
is "diligently" prosecuting a civil action in the federal courts. 336 
Also, no suit can be brought to require a state to prescribe a sched-
ule for variance or exemption unless the citizen-plaintiff demon-
strates the state has failed to prescribe schedules in "a substantial 
number of cases .... "337 Attorneys' fees and expert witness fees 
may be recovered by any party when the court determines the 
award is "appropriate."338 Surprisingly, only four citizen suits have 
been brought under the SDWA.339 
Similarly, Section 7002 of RCRA allows any person to com-
mence a civil suit in federal district court against any person in vio-
lation of the Act or regulations, any person who is contributing to 
or contributed to management of solid or hazardous waste which 
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health 
or the environment, or to compel EPA to perform nondiscretionary 
duties.340 The suit must be brought in the district where the viola-
tion or the endangerment occurred or may occur, or in the district 
court for the District of Columbia, to compel EPA to perform a 
nondiscretionary duty.341 There must be advance notice to EPA, 
the alleged violator, and the state where the alleged violation oc-
curred sixty days before the suit is filed (ninety days for suits alleg-
ing imminent endangerment), unless the complaint alleges a 
violation of the provisions regulating hazardous waste manage-
ment. 342 Again, a citizen suit cannot be brought if EPA or the au-
333. SDWA § 1449(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (1988). 
334. SDWA § 1449(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (1988). 
335. SDWA § 1449(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b) (1988). 
336. SDWA § 1449(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b) (1988). 
337. SDWA § 1449(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b) (1988). 
338. SDWA § 1449(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (1988). 
339. See S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 16.06(2]. 
340. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988). 
341. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988). 
342. RCRA § 7002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1988). Most courts have found the 
advance notice rules to be jurisdictional and without exception. See, e.g., Garcia v. 
CECOS Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1985); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 
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thorized state is pursuing civil or criminal enforcement. 343 A 
citizen plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief, 344 assessment of civil 
penalties, and costs including fees for attorneys and expert witnesses 
(if the party is "prevailing" or "substantially prevailing"). 34s As 
with the SDWA citizen suit provisions, the RCRA citizen suit pro-
vision has been little utilized, perhaps because of the minimal re-
F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985). But see Profitt v. Commissioners of Bristol Township, 754 
F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985). 
343. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B), (C) (1988). 
(B) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(I)(B) of this section if the 
Administrator, in order to restrain or abate acts or conditions which may have con· 
tributed or are contributing to the activities which may present the nlleged 
endangerment-
(!) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under section 6973 of 
this title or under section 106 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9606]; 
(li) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of the Comprehen· 
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 
9604); 
(ill) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study 
under section 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 [42 U.S.C. 9604) and is diligently proceeding with a reme-
dial action under that Act (42 U.S.C.A. 9601 et seq.]; or 
(iv) has obtained a court order (mcluding a consent decree) or issued an ndminis-
trative order under section 106 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 [42 U.S.C. § 9606] or section 6973 of this 
title pursuant to which a responsible party is diligently conducting a removal ac-
tion, Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIFS), or proceeding with a 
remedial action. 
In the case of an administrative order referred to in clause (iv), actions under subsec-
tion (a)(I)(B) of this section are prohibited only as to the scope and duration of the 
administrative order referred to in clause (iv). 
(C) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(I)(B) of this section if the 
State, in order to restrain or abate acts or conditions which may have contributed or 
are contributing to the activities which may present the nlleged endangerment-
(!) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under subsec-
tion(a)(1 )(B) of this section; 
(li) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 
9604]; or 
(ill) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study 
under section 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9604] and is diligently proceeding with a reme-
dial action under that Act [42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.]. 
RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B)-(C), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)-(C) (1988). 
344. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B)-(C), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)-(C) (1988). Citizens 
may not, however, seek an injunction against the siting of a new TSD facility or enjoin 
issuance of a permit for a TSD facility. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6972(b)(2)(D) (1988). Transporters that are common carriers may not be sued unless 
they failed to exercise due care. RCRA § 7002(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(g) (1988). 
345. RCRA § 7002(a)(2), (e), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2), (e) (1988). 
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porting obligations for facilities under RCRA. 346 
Under a recent provision added to CERCLA, there is limited citi-
zen enforcement of final Section 106(a) orders and settlement agree-
ments. A suit may be brought in federal district court against any 
person other than EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances Dis-
ease Registry (ATSDR) to compel compliance with "any standard, 
regulation, condition, requirement, or order ... " which has become 
effective under CERCLA, including interagency agreements for 
federal facilities. 347 Suits may also be brought against EPA and the 
ATSDR to compel performance of a nondiscretionary duty.348 
Again, actions must be brought in the district court for the District 
of Columbia when suing to compel EPA or ATSDR to perform a 
nondiscretionary duty.349 The court may award civil penalties and 
grant costs (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) 
to the "prevailing" or "substantially prevailing" party when appro-
priate. 350 Sixty days notice must be given before the suit is com-
menced, 351 and no suit may be brought if the government is 
"diligently prosecuting an action" under CERCLA or RCRA.352 
1986 amendments authorized EPA to provide grants of up to 
$50,000 to help with technical assistance on the danger, study, and 
response actions for "any group of individuals which may be af-
fected by a release or threatened release ... " at listed facilities.35J 
Any such group of individuals can also petition EPA to conduct a 
preliminary assessment of an unlisted site and petition A TSDR to 
conduct a preliminary health assessment.354 ATSDR is also au-
thorized to provide health information regarding exposure to indi-
viduals pursuant to cooperative agreements with states.355 If 
ATSDR finds there is a "significant risk to human health" EPA is 
required to take such steps as may be necessary to reduce exposure 
346. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.06[1][c]. 
347. CERCLA § 310(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1)-(2) (1988). Citizen groups 
had sought in 1984 a federal cause of action for personal injuries and citizen suits to 
abate imminent hazards. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.05[3][t][ii][c]. 
348. CERCLA § 310(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2) (1988). 
349. CERCLA § 310(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b)(2) (1988). 
350. CERCLA § 310(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1988). 
351. CERCLA § 310(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(e) (1988). 
352. CERCLA § 310(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2) (1988). 
353. CERCLA § 117(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e) (1988). 
354. CERCLA §§ 104(i)(6), 105(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(i)(6), 9605(d) (1988). 
355. CERCLA § 104(i)(4) (1988), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(4), amended by Pub. L. No. 
99-499 § 110 (1986). 
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and eliminate or substantially mitigate the risk to health.356 There 
is also a federal commencement date for triggering state statutes of 
limitations for state law causes of actions covering personal or prop-
erty damage from exposure to Superfund releases.357 Such statutes 
of limitations do not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or reason-
ably should have known the injury or damage was caused or con-
tributed to by the substance release. 3ss 
Section 107(a) of CERCLA also allows recovery of response costs 
by parties other than the state and federal government, such as 
neighboring property owners. 359 Private parties are limited to re-
sponse cost recovery, however, and cannot obtain injunctive relief 
except pursuant to pendent state claims. 360 As originally drafted, 
CERCLA included a victim compensation provision for physical 
injuries for hazardous wastes, but the provision was deleted before 
enactment. 361 
Under state law, rules of allocation for groundwater that are uti-
lized to remedy groundwater pollution are used less than state com-
mon law causes of action against tortious conduct.362 The viability 
of groundwater allocation rules to remedy contamination depended 
for many years upon which rule of allocation was followed. For 
example, in a "correlative rights" state, no landowner would have a 
superior right to pollute groundwater, but in an "absolute owner-
ship" state, landowners were generally considered to own the 
groundwater beneath their property and could essentially do what 
they wanted. 363 It is now relatively well established that, despite 
earlier cases to the contrary, an overlying landowner has a right to 
uncontaminated groundwater whatever the state system of water al-
location.364 Remedies under state common law may include injunc-
356. CERCLA § 104(i)(11), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(ll) (1988), amended by Pub. L 
No. 99-499 § 110 (1986). 
357. CERCLA § 309(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(l) (1988). 
358. CERCLA § 309(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4) (1988). This rule is effective ret-
roactively to December 11, 1980. 
359. S. NOVICK, supra note 91, § 13.06[3]; Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 
792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 605 F. 
Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985). 
360. S. NoviCK, supra note 91, § 13.06[3], (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985)); Velsicol Chern. Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 15 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20103 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)). 
361. 125 Cong. Rec. § 9173-80 (daily ed. July 11, 1979). 
362. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 32. 
363. /d. 
364. Compare Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934), ol·er-
ru/ed by Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982) with Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 
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tive relief, a court-ordered cleanup plan, or actual damages, 
including costs of obtaining water supplies, lost profits, and reduced 
property values.365 Increasingly, courts are finding damages alone 
an insufficient remedy for pollution and have enjoined activities 
causing contamination. 366 
386 Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403 (1956); Reinhart v. Lancaster Area Refuse Authority, 201 
Pa. Super. 614, 193 A.2d 670 (1963); Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154 Mont. 414, 
465 P.2d 314 (1970); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); see 
also Davis, Groundwater Pollution: Case Law Theories/or Relief, 39 Mo. L. RBV. 117, 
120 (1974). 
365. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 32; A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.08[1] (citing 
Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp. 976 (D. Kan. 1984), 656 F. Supp. 316 (D. Kan. 
1987) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 858 F.2d 1449 (1988), reh'g denied (1988)). Injunctive 
relief is generally awarded when there is a continuing nuisance. "Injunctive relief may 
be particularly appropriate in soil and water pollution cases due to the importance ac-
corded the preservation of our natural resources and the protection of the environ· 
ment." Turner, The Role of Private Litigation in Protecting Against Groundwater 
Pollution, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 443, 454-55 (1987). Courts have ordered removal of 
wastes and contaminated soil and water, New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 
1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 
824 (1981); Village of Wilsonville v. Earthline Corp., 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2137 
(7th Cir. 1978); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982); reclamation of a site to its 
prior condition, Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., supra; Village of Wilsonville 
v. Earthline Corp., supra; and in some cases prohibition of further operation of the 
facility, Village of Wilsonville v. Earthline Corp., supra; Neal v. Darby, 282 S.C. 277, 
318 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Temporary damages to property are generally based on loss in rental value from the 
time of injury to the time of suit. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Vroom, 480 So. 2d 108 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Permanent damages may be based on loss of market value, 
or the cost of restoring land to its prior condition, if the costs of restoration are not 
prohibitive. /d.; see also Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 314 
(1970); Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (Ln. 1978). 
366. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 849 (2)(e) ·(f), comments (1964). 
Courts do, however, refuse to issue an injunction by balancing the equities in favor of 
the defendant. See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 
N.E.2d 824 (1981). Potential private plaintiffs under section 107(a)(4)(B) include: in-
nocent site owners, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 21 
Env't Rep. Cas. 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1984); potentially responsible site owners or genera-
tors, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 
1984), City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); und neigh-
boring landowners, Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985), 
Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
Several courts have imposed limitations on private actions for recovery costs. For 
example, it has been held that there may only be private recovery for damage from sites 
on the National Priority List, Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 
21 Env't Rep. Cas. 1108, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1984); contra New York v. Shore Realty 
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1046 (2d Cir. 1985); see generally Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. 
Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (S.D. Fla. 1984), or pursuant to governmentally 
ordered removal or containment action, Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow 
Chemical Co., supra. One court has also held that liability under section 107(a)(4)(B) is 
several and not strict. Smith Land & Improvement Co. v. Rapid American Corp., No. 
86-0016 (M.D. Pa. 1987) cited in STEVER, supra note 116, § 6.07[2)[1]. It has also been 
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Possible theories of liability for groundwater contamination in-
clude nuisance, negligence, trespass, and strict liability.l67 For pur-
poses of nuisance, when determining the nature of relief for the 
groundwater contamination, courts will consider "the extent and 
duration of the harm; the character of the harm; the preventability 
of the harm; the locality of the activity; and the social utility of the 
defendant's conduct."368 Nuisance continues to be the most com-
mon theory of liability for harm caused by pollution.369 To estab-
lish a nuisance, there need not be a showing of negligence on the 
part of the defendant so long as there is an unreasonable interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of another landowner's property 
from hazardous waste.370 One court has held that groundwater 
contamination in violation of a state water quality standard is a nui-
sance per se. 371 
If groundwater contamination is so extensive as to threaten injury 
to public health or injure public drinking water supplies, the nui-
sance may be deemed a public nuisance. 372 The reasonableness of 
suggested that governmental approval of a private remedial plan is a prerequisite. See, 
Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (S.D. Fla. 1984), 
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Cal. 1984), modified 792 
F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 
(D. Del. 1985); but cf Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984); 
Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 
1984). By regulation EPA does require that private response actions pursuant to a 
section 106 consent decree or administrative order be pre-approved as well as response 
actions by potential claimants against the Superfund, 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(1) (1989). 
EPA does not require approval for private response actions but does provide general 
criteria for consistency with the NCP. 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2) (1989). It is generally 
accepted that a potentially responsible party may use section 107(a)(4)(B) for response 
costs against other responsible parties. STEVER, supra note 116, § 6.07[2][1]. 
Section 310 of CERCLA does authorize a citizen suit for injunctive relief for enforce-
ment of any "standard, regulation, requirement, or order which has become effec-
tive ... "under CERCLA, but applies to only a very limited group of actions by EPA 
under CERCLA. See STEVER supra note 116, § 6.07[2][1]. 
367. For a discussion of each of these theories, see infra notes 384-403 and accompa-
nying text. 
368. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 33. 
369. TURNER, supra note 365, at 448; e.g., Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 241 Kan. 
102, 117, 734 P.2d 1113, 1124 (1987); see also Pollard v. Land West, Inc., 96 Idaho 274, 
276, 526 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1974); Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154 Mont. 414, 442, 
465 P.2d 314, 318 (1970); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677, 681 (Okla. 
1958); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1245 (R.I. 1982); Watson v. Great Lakes Pipe-
line Co., 85 S.D. 310,311, 182 N.W.2d 314,315 (1970); Branch v. Western Petroleum, 
Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 272 (Utah 1982); Haveman v. Beulow, 36 Wash. 2d 185, 186, 217 
P.2d 313, 315 (1950). 
370. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1249 (R.I. 1982). 
371. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982). 
372. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985); Village 
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the interference is evaluated by comparing the extent of public harm 
to the utility of the conduct causing the harm. 373 Evidence that the 
conduct violates a statute or ordinance is especially significant in 
demonstrating public harm. 374 Many statutes and local ordinances 
authorize injunctions against public nuisance and assessment of 
civil penalties or, in some instances, criminal sanctions.375 Increas-
ingly, courts have rejected the traditional distinction between public 
and private nuisance, acknowledging that the same tortious conduct 
can be considered both a public and private nuisance. 376 A local 
government which owns or operates a TSD facility that constitutes 
a nuisance may also be responsible for a taking of private property 
without just compensation under state and federal constitutional 
law.377 
In early negligence cases involving groundwater pollution, the 
foreseeability of the harm for activities leading to groundwater pol-
lution sometimes posed a hurdle to demonstrating negligence.378 
Statutes of limitations and the requirement of demonstrating a duty 
continue to create problems in establishing liability under a theory 
of negligence.379 Strict liability only applies when the polluting ac· 
tivities are ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous,380 but has 
been increasingly recognized in the disposal of toxic wastes.381 
of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 27, 426 N.E.2d 824, 837 (1981); Neal v. 
Darby, 282 S.C. 277, 286, 318 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ct. App. 1984). A public nuisance action 
may be brought by state, county, or municipal officials. 1 A. RATHKOPF & D. 
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZoNING AND PLANNING§ 7A.03, at 7A-8 (4th ed. Supp. 
1988) [hereinafter RATHKOPF). 
373. 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 372, § 7A.03, at 7A-10. 
374. Id. at 7A-10. 
375. Id. at 7A-11. 
376. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 184, 494 P.2d 
700, 706 (1972). 
377. Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th 
Cir. 1986); Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 285 (E.D.N.C. 1981); 
Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F. Supp. 778, 782 (E.D.N.C. 1981), aff'd, 696 F.2d 992 
(4th Cir. 1982). 
378. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 34. 
379. TURNER, supra note 365, at 451. 
380. See discussion supra notes 340-346. Toxic waste disposal close to domestic 
wells has been determined to be an abnormally dangerous activity in Florida, Kentucky, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Utah. Cities Serv. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1975); 
Yammer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969); New Jersey v. Ventron, 94 
N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983); Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Co., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1986); and Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982). But 
see Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 241 Kan. 102, 734 P.2d 1113 (1987) (natural gas 
development not an abnormally dangerous activity). 
381. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.08[1). 
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A common impediment to trespass is that statutes of limitations 
may begin to run for trespass when the pollution occurs, rather than 
when an injury occurs or is discovered.382 Common law causes of 
action face difficulties in establishing liability for groundwater con-
tamination including statutes of limitations, demonstrating causa-
tion between the polluting activities and the resulting harm, 383 and 
the possibility of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff 
in negligence suits. 384 Traditional defenses to liability for property 
damage are also available, such as laches and prescription. 3ss Other 
frequently asserted defenses include compliance with federal or 
state legislation, compliance with local zoning ordinances, sovereign 
immunity, and exclusive remedies provided by federal or state legis-
lation.386 There has been, however, a "gradual" trend toward ex-
382. TURNER, supra note 365, at 451. Leakage of hazardous waste into a neighbor's 
soil or groundwater may constitute trespass. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS 
§§ 158 comment g, 159(1) (1964). 
383. Miller v. Cudahy Co., 567 F. Supp. 892, 898 (D. Kan. 1983) (discussed in note 
401 infra); see also Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Haz-
ardous Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 117 (1980). In a few cases, courts have ac-
cepted causation on the basis of res ipsa loquitur when the injury was under the 
exclusive control of the defendant. See, e.g., Weston Drilling Co. v. Tupper, 243 Miss. 
589, 139 So. 2d 361 (1962); Peyton v. Hammer, 269 N.E.2d 136, 27 Ohio !\fisc. 68 
(1970). 
384. HENDERSON, supra note 1, at 34. 
385. A. TARLOCK, supra note 1, § 4.08[4]; see, e.g., Miller v. Cudahy Co., 567 F. 
Supp. 892 (D. Kan. 1983) (unsuccessful use of prescription defense). In a companion 
case to Miller, the district court also rejected defendants' argument that they could not 
be held liable for groundwater contamination if the plaintiff were to be unable to obtain 
the necessary state permit for withdrawal of the groundwater. Miller v. Cudahy Co., 
656 F. Supp. 316 (D. Kan. 1987) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 858 F.2d 1449 (1988), reh'g 
denied (1988). On appeal the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an award of S3.6 
million in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages for the permanent nui-
sance created by a salt mining operation. The salt had made the plaintiffs' groundwater 
unfit for crop irrigation, necessitating a change to less profitable dryland crops. The 
Tenth Circuit held that the district court had correctly applied Kansas law in basing 
actual damages on the difference between the net value of com crops that would have 
been grown using supplemental irrigation without groundwater contamination and the 
net value of the wheat and milo crops which had been grown. The award of punitive 
damages was upheld because the defendants had maintained the nuisance with a reck-
less disregard of the plaintiffs' rights. Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449 (lOth Cir. 
1988) reh'g denied (1988). 
386. RATHKOPF, supra note 372, § 7A.03[2][a]-[c]. Compliance with state or federal 
regulation is irrelevant to strict liability, and is only relevant to negligence to the extent 
compliance is accepted as due care. Its relevance to nuisance, however, is more trouble-
some and may depend upon the theory of nuisance alleged. /d. § 7A.03[2][a][i]. 
Although one court has held that compliance with local zoning laws precludes a public 
nuisance, Greene v. Castle Concrete Co., 181 Colo. 309, 509 P.2d 588 (1973), the better 
view analytically is that such compliance is one factor to be utilized in assessing the 
reasonableness of the alleged interference. 
Any defense to state common law claims which asserts that federal statutory reme-
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pansion of liability for groundwater contamination. 387 
v. 
STATE AND LOCAL LAND USE REGULATION TO 
PREVENT GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION 
Groundwater contamination has been documented in all fifty 
states. 388 Despite the variety of federal statutes that impact on 
groundwater, direct regulation to preserve groundwater quality is 
primarily left to state and local governments. As of 1982, approxi-
mately forty states and territories had general environmental stat-
utes granting authority to protect groundwater.389 However, by 
1985, only twelve states had enacted legislation specifically requir-
ing groundwater protection; fifteen additional states had an existing 
policy for protecting groundwater quality; and eighteen more states 
were in the process of establishing a groundwater protection policy 
for the first time. 390 Both the Leaking Underground Storage Tank 
program (LUST) and the Underground Injection Control program 
(UIC) leave regulatory authority to the states. Unfortunately, 
states have greater responsibility for groundwater protection at a 
time of decreased federal funding. 
Increasingly, state and local land use restrictions are the most 
dies are exclusive is unlikely to succeed where the injury is groundwater contamination. 
Most of the relevant federal statutes expressly preserve state common law remedies. 
See, e.g., CWA § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988); SDWA § 1449(e), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300j-8(e) (1988); RCRA § 7002(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1988); CERCLA § 107G), 42 
U.S.C. § 9607G) (1988). See also Chappell v. SCA Serv., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1087 (C.D. 
Ill. 1982); New York v. Monarch Chern. Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 343, 443 N.Y.S.2d 967 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies/or 
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121 (1985). 
387. RATHKOPF, supra note 372, § 7A.03[2][a]-[c]. Disposal of waste, especially 
toxic waste, can expose corporations and corporate officers to criminal liability as well. 
Many states have criminal nuisance statutes for aggravated public nuisances and stat-
utes criminalizing conduct which recklessly endangers the public health or welfare. As 
a matter of federal law, a number of environmental statutes provide criminal penalties, 
including the Refuse Act of 1899, the Clean Water Act, RCRA, and CERCLA. In 
addition, federal criminal laws prohibiting mail and wire fraud, conspiracy, and the 
Racketeer, Influence and Corrupt Organization Act may be utilized. In addition to 
corporate liability, there is a "growing trend" with environmental violations to indict 
corporate employees when the effect of the violation is serious or when significant data 
has been withheld. SeeM. DORE, LAW OF TOXIC TORTS, § 29.03(3], n.41 (1990). 
388. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-0-233, PROTECTING 
THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER FROM CONTAMINATION (Oct. 1984). 
389. OFFICE OF GROUNDWATER PROTECTION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, A GROUNDWATER PROTECTION STRATEGY FOR THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION AGENCY 21 (Aug. 1984). 
390. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, I OVERVIEW OF STATE 
GROUNDWATER PROGRAM SUMMARIES A-9 (Mar. 1985). 
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stringent means of groundwater protection. Zoning ordinances typ-
ically classify TSD facilities as heavy industry, with most ordi-
nances classifying the facilities as conditional uses, giving zoning 
boards maximum control over location, design, and operation. 391 
TSD facilities may also be subject to performance zoning, which 
uses descriptive or numerical standards to evaluate a proposed use, 
or to impact zoning, which evaluates the effect of a proposed use on 
the carrying capacity of an environmentally sensitive area. 392 Sev-
eral communities have utilized impact zoning for aquifer protec-
tion. 393 Other land use techniques utilized include purchase of fee 
interests and development rights, conservation easements, planned 
unit development ordinances, site review, environmental impact as-
sessments, and transferable development rights.394 
Legal challenges to groundwater protection ordinances may in-
clude ultra vires, statutory, or constitutional challenges. 395 
Although ultra vires challenges to local governmental authority are 
unlikely to succeed,396 a municipality may have more difficulty 
overcoming statutory substantive and procedural challenges.397 
Given recent Supreme Court decisions under the takings clause, 398 
any land use restriction that significantly limits the development po-
tential of land may be challenged as a taking. 399 Ordinances impos-
ing density restrictions are also susceptible to due process 
challenges in states with strong precedents against exclusionary 
zoning.400 In some states, as a matter of state constitutional law, 
391. RATHKOPF, supra note 372, § 7A.05(1] (1987). 
392. I d. § 7 A.05[2]. 
393. See, e.g., Fla., Broward County, Ordinance No. 94-60 (August 30, 1984}. 
394. RATHKOPF, supra note 372, § 7A.05[2][a], [b]. 
395. Yanggen & Amrhein, Ground Water Quality Regulation: Existing Go~·emmen­
tal Authority and Recommended Roles, 14 CoLUM. J. OF ENvrL L 1, 58-93 (1989}. 
396. See, e.g., Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 
N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971); Goddard v. Bd. of Appeals of Concord, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1001, 
433 N.E.2d 98 (1982); City of Austin v. Jamail, 662 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983) 
(upholding exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
397. See, e.g., City of Schenectady v. Flacke, 100 A.D.2d 349, 475 N.Y.S.2d 506 
(1984). 
398. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also 
Malone, A Fifteen Year Overriew of the Coastal Zone Management Act and Coastal 
Protection, "Slip Sliding Away,"- Colo. L. Rev.- (1991). 
399. See, e.g., Annicelli v. Town of S. Kingston, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983). But see 
Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Metro. Dade County, 349 So. 
2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (recognized groundwater protection as a valid land 
use purpose and upheld downzoning). 
400. See, e.g., Alabano v. Mayor & Township Comm. of the Township of Washing-
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local communities may be required to take a fair share of regional 
housing needs or justify exclusionary ordinances with a stronger 
public interest than that of a "rational basis" test required for eco-
nomic legislation.401 Complete exclusion of TSD facilities or out-
of-state waste from a community may also be challenged under 
state or federal constitutional law. As a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, exclusion of out-of-state waste is per se discriminatory 
under the commerce clause and any such ordinance will likely be 
invalidated. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey 402 the Supreme 
Court invalidated a New Jersey statute which had been justified by 
the state as necessary to limit the consumption of dwindling landfill 
space. One commentator observed that the case suggests that states 
and local governments may have an obligation to accept a fair share 
of TSD facilities. 403 
Governmentally operated TSD facilities may in some instances 
be immune from local zoning laws.404 In contrast, not only does a 
municipal government have the power to separate TSD facilities 
from incompatible land uses, but also a local government's failure 
to create such a buffer zone may be challenged as inverse condem-
nation of the neighboring property.40s 
Given the likelihood and susceptibility of local governmental or-
dinances restricting TSD facilities, a number of states have enacted 
statutes creating state siting authorities which approve or disap-
prove the sites of proposed facilities.406 Although states have the 
ton, 194 N.J. Super. 265, 476 A.2d 852 (1984); D & R Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Greene 
County, 630 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
401. RATHKOPF, supra note 372, § 7A.05(4). Such challenges have been utilized, 
however, only to challenge residential apportionment. /d. at 7A-64; see also A. 
T ARLOCK, Anywhere But Here: An Imroduction to State Control of Hazardous Waste 
Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1 (1981}. 
402. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). On this and other issues of state and federal preemption 
oflocal regulation, see Schwenke, Lockett, & Walls, Local Control of Hazardous Wastes 
Through Land Use Regulation, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 603 (1986). 
403. RATHKOPF, supra note 372, §§ 7A.05(4), 7A-64. A more direct implication of 
the case, however, would be that states have an obligation to accept their fair share of 
waste, regardless of its origin. 
404. Rutgers State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972); City of Temple 
Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976). Private entities acting under a govern-
mental contract are less likely to be found immune. See, e.g., Omaha Fish & Wildlife 
Club v. Comm. Refuse Disposal, Inc., 213 Neb. 234, 329 N.W.2d 335 (1983); Washing-
ton County Cease, Inc. v. Persico, 99 A.D.2d 321, 473 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1984). 
405. RATHKOPF, supra note 372, § 7A-66, (citing Wilson v. Key Tronic Corp., 40 
Wash. App. 802, 701 P.2d 518 (1985)). 
406. A. T ARLOCK, Siting New or Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facili-
ties: The Pigs in the Parlors of the 1980s, 11 NAT. REsOURCES J. 429 (1984); see, e.g., 
1990] GROUNDWATER AND LAND USE 63 
power to preempt totally local land use restrictions in non-home 
rule and home rule jurisdictions,407 most states have only partially 
or conditionally preempted local land use regulation.408 In some 
states which do preempt local land use regulation, cognizance of 
local concerns is accomplished by requiring state consideration of 
local effects and land use plans, preparation of state plans to identify 
potential sites, or negotiated "settlements" between the applicant 
and affected local communities.409 
VI. 
THE NEED FOR REFORM 
Given the labyrinth of federal regulation potentially impacting 
groundwater, it is difficult to justify increased federal regulation to 
remedy groundwater contamination and shortages. In the past few 
years, programs like the LUST program and UIC program were 
designed to "fill in the gaps" of federal regulation, which too fre-
quently addressed groundwater as a legislative afterthought. Un-
realistically, Congress continues to create regulatory programs for 
the states to administer, with little or no federal funding and even 
less guidance. At the same time, the federal statutes addressing air 
IND. CoDE§ 13-7.86-3 (1985); IOWA CoDE§ 455 B.444 (1985); MICH. CoMP. LAws 
§ 299.517(3) (1984). 
407. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (non-home rule preemption); Town 
of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 392 Mnss. 107,466 N.E.2d 
102 (1984); Township of Cascade v. Cascade Resource Recovery, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 
580, 325 N.W.2d 500 (1982); Clermont Envtl. Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio 
St. 3d 44, 442 N.E.2d 1278 (1982) (home rule preemption). 
408. Compare CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-15-202 (Supp. 1985) (broad presentation of 
local land use restrictions); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.855 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 
Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2180 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REv. STAT. 
§ 260.430(2) (Vernon Pocket Pt. 1986); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 68-46-108(9) (Supp. 1985 
amended by 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 993) (state and local approval required); N.Y. 
ENVTL CoNSERV. LAW§ 27-1105(b) (Consol. 1988) Oocal ordinances at the time of 
application preserved); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 111.5 para. 1039.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1985) (possible state reversal of local exclusionary decision); CAL HEALTH & SAFEn" 
CoDE§§ 25149.1 et seq. (West 1984 & Supp. 1986) (state restrictions on land disposal); 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-215 (Supp. 1990); GA. CoDE ANN. § 12-8-66 (Supp. 1985) 
(amended by Ga. Laws 1344); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1303-1304 (1986); MISS. 
CoDE ANN. 1972 § 17-17-27 (Supp. 1985); MONT. CoDE ANN. § 15-1()..4Qb (1985); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-A:4 (Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 459.400-.600 
(1985); N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 23-29-04 (Supp. 1989); W.VA. CoDE§ 20-9-3 (1989) (pre-
emption not explicitly determined). Most states have preempted total exclusion by a 
local government of new or expanded TSD facilities. RATHKOPF supra note 372, 
§ 7A.06[3] (citing statutes in Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming). 
409. RATHKOPF, supra note 372, §§ 7A.06[4)-[6). 
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and water pollution have led to an increased reliance on under-
ground discharge and disposal of waste. As RCRA's restrictions on 
land disposal are slowly implemented and state and local govern-
ments refuse to have TSD facilities in their "backyards;• it is rea-
sonable to expect an increase in illegal dumping of waste and the 
exploitation of regulatory loopholes for continued underground dis-
posal. Beyond the problems created by deliberate discharge of 
waste and seepage from storage and disposal of waste, runoff or 
nonpoint source contamination continues to be essentially uncon-
trolled at the federal level and in all but a few states.410 
In short, there is no reason to expect the federal programs, even 
as recently amended, will significantly improve current ground-
water problems. For example, leaking underground storage tanks 
have been identified as a source of groundwater contamination. 
Congress responded with the LUST program, which leaves regula-
tory authority to the already overburdened states.411 Similarly, reg-
ulatory enforcement of the underground injection control program 
was handed over to the states.412 Not surprisingly, by 1985 only 
four states were administering UIC programs.413 In any event, the 
UIC program only applies to injections which threaten "public .. 
water supplies,414 leaving unprotected many rural residents who 
rely on private wells. Pesticide use is widely recognized as one of 
the primary sources of groundwater contamination. At least 
nineteen different pesticides have been detected in groundwater in 
twenty-four states,415 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)416 has a provision addressing ground-
water pollution. As of 1986, EPA had only provided assurances of 
safety under FIFRA for thirty-seven of the over 600 active ingredi-
ents used in 45,000 pesticides, and EPA had not completed a final 
safety reassessment for any active ingredient.4t7 
Even when federal statutes arguably provide EPA with the au-
thority to protect groundwater, EPA has been unwilling or unable 
to utilize the authority. EPA has taken the position that it lacks 
410. See infra notes 419-420 and accompanying text. 
411. See supra notes 246-269 and accompanying text. 
412. See supra notes 130-153 and accompanying text. 
413. Marks, supra note 81, at 13. 
414. See supra note 96. 
415. Environmental Protection Agency, "Agricultural Chemicals in Groundwater: 
Proposed Pesticide Strategy 21" (1987) (hereinafter EPA Proposed Strategy). 
416. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq. (1988). 
417. Myers, Groundwater Issues Emerge as Focus on FIFRA Reform, AORIC. LAW 
UPDATE at 4, Apr. 1988. 
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power to enforce RCRA's prohibition on open dumping, leaving 
enforcement to the states and private parties by citizen suits.418 
Although the Clean Water Act specifically refers to groundwater, 
EPA has not regulated groundwater in any way, has not required 
regulation at the state level, has not established quality criteria or 
guidelines for groundwater under § 304, and has not extended the 
permit system for point source discharges to discharges into 
groundwater. 
These illustrations demonstrate that, at a minimum, reform 
would simply involve clarifying and reorganizing existing programs 
pertaining to groundwater. The Clean Water Act could be used to 
establish quality criteria for groundwater under § 304, to require 
water quality standards under § 303, or even go so far as to extend 
the permit system for point source discharges to discharges into or 
affecting groundwater. Such use of the Act, however, would 
squarely present the issue of Congress' power to regulate ground-
water (or, at the least, groundwater connected to surface water) 
under the Commerce Clause should Congress remove the Act's ref-
erences to "navigable waters."419 Given that the protection of 
health is the primary focus of the Safe Drinking Water Act, Con-
gress could require that that Act's protection extend to water sup-
plies not currently covered within the definition of "public water 
systems." Under RCRA, Congress could also require EPA to en-
force the open dumping prohibition. 
These reforms, however, would do little to address the problem of 
nonpoint source contamination of groundwater, particularly from 
pesticide use.420 Congress and EPA have just begun to focus on the 
interrelationship between pesticide use and groundwater contami-
nation. EPA has begun to develop under FIFRA data require-
ments for active ingredients likely to reach groundwater, do special 
reviews of problematic pesticides, and survey active ingredients 
likely to leak into groundwater.421 In 1987, Congress introduced 
two bills to control pesticide contamination of groundwater.422 The 
bills would have required EPA to set groundwater residue guidance 
levels for pesticides having the potential to leak into groundwater. 
Under the bills' regime, if EPA finds that pesticide concentrations 
418. Marks, supra note 81, at 12. 
419. See supra note 91. 
420. As is frequently the case, agriculture has benefitted from exceptions to and gaps 
in federal regulation of the environment, even though agriculture is largely responsible 
for toxic contamination of groundwater and depletion of groundwater supplies. 
421. Myers, supra note 417, at 4. 
422. S. 1419, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 3174, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
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reach or exceed fifty percent of the guidance level, EPA must notify 
the designated state agency where the groundwater is located. The 
state then has six months to rectify or prevent any adverse effects on 
human health or the environment from the contamination. If the 
state fails to do so, EPA must take preventive or remedial measures. 
In addition, if EPA determines that it is likely a guidance level will 
be exceeded in drinking water wells as a result of pesticide use, in 
accordance with its labeling, the registration can be amended to 
comply with the guidance level through geographic limitations, lim-
its on application rates, limitations on timing and frequency of use, 
limitations on methods of application, storage, handling or disposal, 
and site specific responses. EPA's Proposed Pesticide Strategy rec-
ommends the use of MCLs under the SDWA as a starting point for 
setting the groundwater residue guidance levels.423 Under the Pro-
posed Strategy, there is a rebuttable presumption that the risks 
posed by pesticides exceeding these levels outweigh any benefits. In 
some instances this permits cancelling registration if the manufac-
turer refuses to make any labeling amendments. 424 The Strategy 
also contemplates labeling amendments for pesticides with the po-
tential to reach unacceptable levels.425 Where unacceptable con-
tamination has already occurred, EPA may cancel the use of a 
pesticide in an entire county or state and may provide alternate 
water supplies if the contamination presents an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to human health. 426 
These administrative and legislative proposals are necessary, pre-
liminary steps toward controlling pesticide contamination of 
groundwater. There are, however, two federal programs already in 
operation that could be utilized more effectively to protect ground-
water from agricultural nonpoint source contamination. The 1985 
Farm Bill established the conservation reserve program, which is 
designed to remove from production highly erodible land in produc-
tion at least two consecutive years from 1981 to 1985.427 Farmers 
who want to enroll land in the reserve agree by contract to devote 
the land to conservation uses for ten years in return for technical 
assistance, cost sharing for conservation measures, and annual 
rental payments for retirement of the land.428 The Act authorizes 
423. EPA Proposed Strategy, supra note 415, at 82. 
424. Id. 
425. Id. at 88. 
426. ld. at 122, 136. Comments on the Proposed Strategy were to be submitted to 
EPA by June 27, 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 5830-31 (1988). 
427. 16 u.s.c. §§ 3831-3836 (1988). 
428. 16 u.s.c. §§ 3831-3833. 
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the Secretary of the USDA to include in the program land that 
poses an off-farm environmental threat or that poses a threat to pro-
ductivity due to soil salinity.429 The Secretary, by regulation, could 
identify critical recharge areas threatened or contaminated by pesti-
cide use and qualify farmland within that area for the reserve. 
A recent amendment to the Clean Water Act, in the Water Qual-
ity Act of 1987, provides a mechanism to require farmers to use the 
best management practices to control runoff in order to qualify for 
federal farm subsidies. Under the amendment, the governor of 
every state, after public notice and comment, must submit to EPA 
for approval a state assessment report.430 The report must (1) iden-
tify those waters which, without additional control on nonpoint 
source pollution, "cannot reasonably be expected to attain or main-
tain applicable water quality standards" or the goals and require-
ments of the Clean Water Act; (2) identify categories and 
subcategories of nonpoint sources as well as individual sources 
which add "significant pollution" to those waters in amounts which 
"contribute to such portion not meeting such water quality stan-
dards or such goals and requirements"; (3) describe the process for 
identifying "best management practices and measures" to control 
these nonpoint sources and reduce their pollution "to the maximum 
extent practicable"; and (4) identify and describe state and local 
429. 16 U.S.C. § 3831(c)(2). The program has been utilized recently to control 
nonpoint source water pollution. Under an interim rule, a field suitable for a filter strip 
may be placed in the reserve even if it does not meet the eligibility criteria, if the partici· 
pant agrees to grow permanent grass, forbs, shrubs, or trees on the field. A field is 
considered suitable for use as a filter strip if it: 
[1] Meets the criteria of paragraph [a][l] of this section (§ 704.7, the criteria for 
eligible cropland for the reserve]; 
[2] Is located adjacent to streams having perennial How, other wnterbodies of per· 
manent nature (such as lakes and ponds, or seasonable streams, excluding such nreas 
as gullies or sod waterways; 
[3] Is capable, when permanent grass, forbs, shrubs, or trees nre grown on the 
field, of substantially reducing sediment that otherwise would be delivered to the adja-
cent stream or other waterbodies; and 
(4] Is 1.0 to 1.5 chain lengths (66 to 99 feet) in width: Pro1·ided That such ..,.idth 
may be exceeded to the extent necessary to meet SCS Field Office Technical Guide 
criteria. 
53 Fed. Reg. at 734-35 (Jan. 12, 1988). 
Expansion of the CRP along these lines would also be in keeping with the 1988 Na· 
tional Conservation Program. The top priorities of the program are to: (1) "reduce the 
damage caused by excessive soil erosion on crop, pasture, range, forest, and other rural 
lands" and (2) "protect the quality of ground and surface water against harmful con-
tamination by nonpoint sources." USDA, A National Program for Soil and Water 
Conservation: The 1988-97 Update 8 (March 1988). 
430. Water Quality Act of 1987 [hereinafter WQA) § 319(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1329(a)(1) (1988). 
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programs for controlling such pollution.431 The governors of every 
state must then submit to EPA after public notice and comment a 
management program to control nonpoint source pollution cover-
ing the next four fiscal years.432 Each management program must 
(1) identify the best management practices, taking into account im-
pacts on groundwater quality; (2) identify programs to achieve the 
best management practices; (3) contain a schedule with "annual 
milestones" for implementation of state programs to achieve best 
management practices "at the earliest practicable date"; (4) have 
assurances of adequate enforcement of the program; (5) identify 
sources of funding for implementing the program; and (6) identify 
applications for federal development projects and federal financial 
assistance which the state will review for its consistency with the 
state program.433 The state is to develop the program to the maxi-
mum extent practicable on a watershed-by-watershed basis.434 All 
reports and management programs must be submitted to EPA dur-
ing the eighteen month period beginning on February 4, 1987.435 
Within 180 days after submission of a report or management pro-
gram, the Administrator of EPA must approve or disapprove it in 
whole or in part.436 
If a state fails to submit a report within the designated period, 
EPA by July 1988 was required to identify both the nonpoint 
sources of pollution and water sources threatened by them. 437 If a 
state fails to submit a management program, or the program is re-
jected, a local public agency or organization which "has expertise in 
and authority to control water pollution resulting from nonpoint 
sources" in any area of the state which EPA determines is of "suffi-
cient geographic size" may receive technical assistance for develop-
ing a program for its area.438 Such an area program must be 
submitted to EPA for approval.439 A local agency or organization 
may also receive financial assistance for its program as if it were a 
state. 440 States may also receive technical assistance to develop a 
management program.441 
431. WQA § 319(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (1988). 
432. WQA § 319(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1) (1988). 
433. WQA § 319(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2) (1988). 
434. WQA § 319(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(4) (1988). 
435. WQA § 319(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(c)(2) (1988). 
436. WQA § 319(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d)(1) (1988). 
437. WQA § 319(d)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d)(3) (1988). 
438. WQA § 319(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(e) (1988). 
439. WQA § 319(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(e) (1988). 
440. WQA § 319(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (e) (1988). 
441. WQA § 319(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(f) (1988). 
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If a state is not meeting water quality standards or the Act's re-
quirements due to significant nonpoint source pollution from an-
other state, either state may petition EPA to convene an "interstate 
management conference."442 If the Administrator determines that 
the failure can be attributed to another state, the Administrator 
must so notify the polluting state and convene the conference not 
later than 180 days after the notification. 443 The conference seeks 
to develop an agreement between the states to reduce pollution and 
improve the water quality.444 The agreement then becomes part of 
both states' management program. 44S 
To expedite state programs, states may also receive grants of fed-
eral financial assistance to implement management programs. 446 
Federal assistance may not exceed sixty percent of the state's costs 
of implementation and is made on condition that the forty percent 
does not include other federal assistance.447 Priority in grants is 
given to state programs which will (1) control difficult or serious 
pollution problems and (2) implement innovative methods or prac-
tices of control; (3) control interstate pollution; or (4) carry out 
groundwater quality protection.448 
States may also receive grants for groundwater quality protection 
activities, including "research, planning, groundwater assessments, 
demonstration programs, enforcement, technical assistance, educa-
tion and training to protect the quality of groundwater and to pre-
vent contamination of groundwater from nonpoint sources of 
pollution."449 A grant may not exceed fifty percent of a state's 
costs, with a maximum amount of assistance in any fiscal year of 
$15Q,QQQ.4 SO 
By the end of 1988, each state had to identify categories of 
sources and individual sources significantly contributing to water 
quality problems. A source of erosion and water pollution could 
then determine the most cost-effective means of compliance with 
the best management practices. As currently formulated, the re-
442. WQA § 319(g)(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(g)(1) (1988). 
443. WQA § 319(g)(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(g)(1) (1988). 
444. WQA § 319(g)(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(g)(l) (1988). 
445. WQA § 319(g)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(g)(2) (1988). 
446. WQA § 319(h)(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(1) (1988). 
447. WQA § 319(h)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(3) (1988). Administrative costs cannot 
exceed 10% of the grant. WQA § 319(h)(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(l2) (1988). Not 
more than 15% of the amount appropriated for grants can go to any one state. WQA 
§ 319(h)(4), 33 u.s.c. 1329(h)(4) (1988). 
448. WQA § 319(h)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(5) (1988). 
449. WQA § 319(i)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(i)(l) (1988). 
450. WQA § 319(i)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(i)(3) (1988). 
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quirement of best management practices (BMP) has very few 
"teeth" in that the state program need only establish "annual mile-
stones" for implementation of BMP and there are no mandatory 
enforcement measures for BMP. Given the significant amount of 
farm income derived from farm subsidies, however, most farmers 
would have to utilize BMP as a matter of economic necessity if 
compliance were necessary to qualify for federal farm subsidies. 
Cross compliance with BMP and revisions to FIFRA could be ef-
fective in limiting pesticide contamination at least on a short term 
basis, pending long term solutions through means such as increased 
integrated pest management and biotechnological improvements.4S1 
It is not surprising given the hodge-podge of federal legislation 
that there are periodic calls for a national groundwater act to coor-
dinate state and federal efforts.452 There are two fundamental issues 
concerning the contents of such an act. First is the question of 
whether the underlying standard of protection for groundwater 
should be nondegradation or an acceptable level of pollution. 
Nondegradation avoids the uncertainties of future groundwater 
needs by providing a margin of safety against not yet realized effects 
of existing pollution. It would be a clear, unequivocal standard 
with the public health and safety as the paramount concern. Al-
lowing some degradation, however, to a set acceptable level of water 
quality better serves concerns of economic efficiency in that the ben-
efits of groundwater protection outweigh the costs. The conflict is 
perhaps best exemplified in the Clean Water Act itself, which pays 
lip service in its goals to nondegradation yet establishes an elaborate 
system of point source controls to bring pollution within acceptable 
limits. If some pollution is deemed acceptable, there are two ways 
in which limitations on pollution could be imposed: (1) classifica-
tion of aquifers by use; or (2) water quality standards based on pro-
tection of public health (similar to the MCLs under the Safe 
451. Increased release on biotechnology, of course, may create more environmental 
problems than it solves. USDA has adopted a formal policy on protecting groundwater 
from harmful substances that optimistically calls for alternative crop management sys-
tems. 52 Fed. Reg. 48,135 (1987). 
452. See e.g., Marks, supra note 81, at 15; Note, A DRASTIC Approach to Control-
ling Groundwater Pollution, 98 YALE L.J. 773 (1989); Tripp & Jaffe, Preventing Ground-
water Pollution: Towards a Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 
HARV. ENVfL. L. REv. 1 (1979). But see Coggins & Glicksman, Groundwater Pollution 
II: An Immodest Proposal for a Strategy to Prevent Groundwater Pollution, 35 U. KAN. 
L. REv. 241 (1987) (state regulation is preferable to increased federal regulation); Wil-
ley & Graff, Federal Water Policy in the United States- An Agenda for Economic and 
Environmental Reform, 13 CoLUM. J. ENVfL. L. 325 (1988) (federal legislation needed 
to establish tradable discharge permits for nonpoint pollution). 
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Drinking Water Act) or based on preservation of designated uses. 
Proponents of a federal groundwater act generilly presume that a 
regulatory approach is necessary over a market-oriented approach 
of incentives, economic sanctions, and tradeable permits. As the 
Clean Water Act demonstrates, there need not be an "either/or" 
approach, in that a comprehensive regulatory system should incor-
porate noncompliance penalties and marketable permits to allow 
polluters to choose the most cost effective method of complying 
with health- or use-based standards. 
Although there has been much controversy about whether federal 
or state and local governments are best situated to regulate ground-
water, it seems reasonable to assume that for the near future 
groundwater regulation will continue to proliferate at every level of 
government. What, then, is the "best" solution to preserve ground-
water? It is, perhaps, this search for the "best" solution that has 
stymied efforts to improve regulation. In recognition of political 
realities and conflicting public concerns, potential reform should be 
evaluated as a continuum from the weakest acceptable level of en-
hanced protection to the most stringent, politically difficult but en-
vironmentally desirable, standards at the federal, state, and local 
levels. The minimum level of federal reform would include exten-
sion of the SDWA beyond "public water systems," clarification of 
EPA's authority to enforce the open dumping prohibition, and in-
creased federal funding and guidance to states to implement fully 
the LUST and UIC programs. A further step along the continuum 
would involve expansion of the Clean Water Act and FIFRA. The 
Clean Water Act would be amended to clarify EPA's authority to 
regulate groundwater to the fullest extent of the Commerce Clause, 
opening the way for federal groundwater quality standards or even 
extension of the point source permit systems to point source dis-
charges into groundwater. To control nonpoint source contamina-
tion, FIFRA could be amended along the lines of the previously 
discussed bills requiring EPA to set groundwater residue guidance 
levels with the sanction of regional cancellation for pesticides which 
could be utilized in fragile waterbasins within the acceptable levels. 
Farmers would also be required to use best management practices 
to control runoff at its source in order to qualify for federal farm 
subsidies. Critical water basins particularly susceptible to pesticide 
contamination would qualify for the conservation reserve program 
and be removed from production for at least ten years. The final 
steps on this continuum would be a national groundwater act with 
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Act. Even if a national groundwater act were to establish enforce-
able standards, states would not necessarily be preempted from im-
posing water quality standards stricter than the federal standards. 
Many states have been very innovative in enforcing state ground-
water standards. For example, as early as 1984, Wisconsin enacted 
a comprehensive groundwater law under which the state agency 
may prohibit polluting activity until compliance with set standards 
are achieved.453 And in 1986, California voters approved the Safe 
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 which pro-
vides that no person in the course of doing business shall knowingly 
discharge or release chemicals, known to the state to cause cancer 
or endanger reproductivity, into water or onto land if such chemi-
cals leak into any source of drinking water.454 Nonpoint source 
contamination must be controlled by local land use restrictions as 
authorized by state legislatures. Local zoning could be utilized to 
prohibit pesticide use in critical recharge areas, limit density, and in 
some instances exclude TSD facilities and hazardous industrial op-
erations. State control over siting decisions would ensure that local 
parochial concerns would not predominate over valid health con-
cerns and any unavoidable need for additional disposal sites. To the 
extent that groundwater allocation affects groundwater quality, 
states must not hesitate to limit use even though limitations on 
water rights may be susceptible to takings challenges, given current 
uncertainty about the degree of interference necessary for a taking. 
There is, in short, no simple, focused solution for groundwater 
preservation. The hydrology of groundwater is such that it is sus-
ceptible to point source and nonpoint source contamination that 
must be regulated at the federal, state, and local levels. As Con-
gress and state legislatures embark on groundwater programs, hope-
fully their consideration will include recognition of the uncertainties 
of the effects of toxic contamination and the difficulties in ground-
water cleanup. Otherwise, whatever preliminary steps are taken 
along the possible continuum of protection will be too little and too 
late. 
453. WIS. STAT.§§ 160.001-160.50 (1984), discussed in Yanggen & Amrhein, supra 
note 395. 
454. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE§§ 25249.5-25250.25 (West Supp. 1989). 
